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 The historiography of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran centers on the root 
causes of social change in Iran.  In this way, authors must generally accomplish two 
things in their histories of the Constitutional Revolution. One, they must describe 
Iranian society during the late Qajar period in order to describe what the Revolution 
changed. Two, they also explain why Iranian society changed. However, these are two 
different projects. The former is largely a social history project, while the latter is one 
largely addressed by sociology (in this case, primarily historical sociology). This paper 
will, broadly speaking, cover three sets of approaches: Whig history, historical 
sociology, and social history. All three of these approaches have different attitudes 
towards social change. Differences amongst the authors in terms of their portrayal of 
Iranian society represent both historiographical shifts and changes in Iranian society. 
This combination of theoretical and political assumptions has affected how we have 
understood the beliefs and organization of Iranian society before the Constitutional 
Revolution and why they changed during the Revolution. Rather than focusing on 1905, 
scholars should turn their attention on 1940's Iran as a way to understand Iranian society 




 An Overview of the Scholarship on the Iranian Constitutional Revolution  
 
 The historiography of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran centers on the root 
causes of social change in Iran. This may seem basic, considering the topic under 
discussion is a revolution. What is less apparent is that this discussion of social change 
is also about the composition of Iranian society. In this way, authors must generally 
accomplish two things in their histories of the Constitutional Revolution. One, they 
must describe Iranian society during the late Qajar period in order to describe what the 
Revolution changed. Two, they also explain why Iranian society changed. This provides 
a starting point and a direction for historical change. However, these are two different 
projects. The former is largely a social history project, while the latter is one largely 
addressed by sociology (in this case, primarily historical sociology). This paper will, 
broadly speaking, cover three sets of approaches: Whig history, historical sociology, 
and social history. All three of these approaches have different attitudes towards social 
change. Further, all three have biases which led them to see Iranian society in different 
ways. Differences amongst the authors in terms of their portrayal of Iranian society 
represent both historiographical shifts and changes in Iranian society. These changes in 
academia affected theories of social change, while changes in the domestic politics of 
Iran changed our notion of Iranian society. This combination of theoretical and political 
assumptions has affected how we have understood the beliefs and organization of 
Iranian society before the Constitutional Revolution and why they changed during the 
Revolution. The goal of tracing these assumptions is to offer solutions to research 
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problems and identify new areas of research into the Constitutional Revolution 
specifically, but also into Iranian history generally.  
 The Iranian Constitutional Revolution is an ideal entry point to study the 
historiographical challenges of modern Iranian history. The Constitutional Revolution is 
an important transition point for scholars. It marks the entry of the Iranian “masses” or 
“crowd” into the political sphere and the adoption of modern administrative and 
political organization by the Iranian state. While authors disagree about why this 
happened, they do agree that the event marked a significant moment of change in Iran. 
For this reason, the Constitutional Revolution is an almost obligatory topic of study for 
scholars of 20th century Iran. This means that the Constitutional Revolution offers a 
common point of comparison between the scholars of Iranian studies and the various 
theoretical approaches to Iranian history. Though the topic is important in both Persian 
and English language scholarship, my study will focus only on English language 
scholarship.  
 English language and Persian language scholars approached the history of the 
Constitutional Revolution differently, making direct comparisons between the two 
difficult. While scholars working and writing in Iran have contributed to the field, they 
have largely done so in the form of memoirs and other first person accounts. The works 
of Kasravi, Malekzadeh, and Nizam al-Islam Kermani, though foundational, occupy a 
precarious space between personal account and academic work.1 They came out of a 
distinct Iranian academic tradition, which developed independently of British and 
American academia. These differences make placing English and Persian language 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-i Mashruteh-i Iran (Tehran, I961); Mehdi Malekzadeh, Tarikh-i Inqilab-i 
Mashrutiyat-i Iran Vol. I (Tehran, 1949); Nizam al-Islam Kermani, Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian, Vol. I 
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works in the same historiography difficult. More often, English language historians use 
these works as primary sources, since these “histories” lapse into narratives written by 
participant-scholars. The focus of this project will be to examine the major works of the 
English language literature. The English language authors listed are a balance between 
the best most relevant to the field of Iranian Studies and to the history of the 
Constitutional Revolution. Because the Constitutional Revolution is one of the 
“foundational” events of 20th century Iranian history, there is significant overlap 
between the two. Further, many of the historiographical problems of the Constitutional 
Revolution are replicated throughout the literature. By limiting the study to the 
Constitutional Revolution, I have been able to delve deeply into the conversation 
between the authors. 
 Each chapter will discuss how scholars have looked at the Constitutional from 
the perspective of global history, religion, and ethnicity. Chapter one will look at how 
scholars have seen the Constitutional Revolution as a “global” event. Chapter two will 
look at the how scholars have characterized the role of the ‘ulama and religion. Chapter 
three will look at how scholars characterized ethnicity. Generally, chapter one will 
function to give an overview of the different theories of social change and chapter two 
and three will examine the two primary ways that scholars have sought to explain the 
essence or mentality of Iranian society. Chapter two will especially focus on how the 
treatment of the ‘ulama. Chapter three will focus on the three most commonly discussed 
ethnic groups: the Azeris, the Armenians, and the Bakhtiyari tribe. The first two 
chapters will be organized chronologically, while the third will be broken into section 
addressing each ethnic group in turn. The discussion will begin with Browne, followed 
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by historical sociology, and finally recent research. Each section will conclude with a 
variety of different research. Below is a brief overview of the major historical school 
and authors that will be addressed.  
 
Whig History  
 Whig history was history written with the assumption that classical liberalism 
was the truest expression of human nature. In this way, Whig history is less a historical 
school than a political ideology supported with historical evidence. Whig history saw 
the past largely in reference to the present.2 Further, it emphasized “the unities that 
underlie the differences” between peoples. These “unities” were an enlightenment 
conception of human nature and society. History was confined to those elites who 
understood the truths and moved history. This simplified the writing of history, largely 
removing the need for imagination by adopting anachronism.3 Whig history assumed a 
particular view of society, or at least a modern society, and projected it into the history 
of the world.  For that reason, the term is now used mainly as a pejorative, and is 
synonymous with elite and Eurocentric histories. However, the foundational text for the 
study of the Constitutional Revolution was a Whig history.  
 The foundational text of the English language literature, The Persian Revolution 
by E.G. Browne, was a Whig history, which was well suited to Browne’s political 
motivations. In addition to his expertise in the Persian language and Persian literature, 
Browne was personally sympathetic to the Constitutionalist cause. He helped found and 
run the Persian Committee to lobby for the Constitutionalist cause in London. This put 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Herbert Butterfiled, The Whig Interpretation of History (New York: Norton, 1965), 11. 
3 Eric Hobsbawm, On History (The New Press: New York, 1997), 210.	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him in contact with Constitutionalists as well as Whig party member, who objected to 
Foreign Minister Grey’s alliance with the Russian Empire at the cost of Persian 
independence (formalized in the 1907 Anglo-Russian Treaty). Further, one of Browne’s 
former students was a foreign office official in the British Legation and served as a 
constant source of information for Browne. His Whig and political sympathies were 
complementary in that they both supported a view of the Constitutional Revolution as 
part of a progression towards liberal self-determination of all deserving nations. A Whig 
interpretation of the Constitutional Revolution was palatable to the British public and 
politicians. Perhaps more than any other single person, Browne was perfectly positioned 
to write an international history of the Constitutional Revolution.  
 Browne’s framework was not suited to explain social change. While logically 
consistent and compelling, Browne took for granted that all societies would eventually 
adopt European style nationalism and liberalism. In so much as Whig history worked to 
“find the unities that underlie the differences and to see all lives as part of one web of 
life,” it could not account for ethnic and religious differences. Whigs took an ethnically 
homogenous nation as the base unit of political organization. Without a nation, people 
were left outside of history and incapable of progress. While some in Iran were familiar 
with the works of John Stuart Mill, the overwhelming majority of Iranians were not, nor 
did the demands or aims of Iranians fit the liberal mold. While The Persian Revolution 
was an important part of the development of the English language scholarship, it has 
almost become a primary-source document. Like the Persian language memoir-histories 
mentioned previously, Browne’s history was a victim of the activist perspective of its 
author. However, it was the starting point for the scholarship that followed it and 
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offered insight into the minds of many of the Constitutional Revolutions supporters, 
especially those in Europe. In its place, the next generation of scholars would focus less 
on elites and more on the motivations of societies or classes. However, a similar tension 
between social theory and social history remained in the historical sociology.  
 
Historical Sociology 
 Historical sociology has attempted to explain social and political change by 
integrating sociological theories and concepts into history. Fundamentally, historical 
sociologists sought to explain social and political change in all societies by focusing on 
“what societies have in common in spite of their differences.”4 Marxian scholars 
emphasized “the role of classes” while non-Marxists (Weberians in the case of Iran) 
stressed “the importance of ideas, cultures, religions, and ideologies.”5 The challenge 
for scholars of Iran was balancing the elegance and analytical usefulness of these 
approaches with the particularities of Iranian society. Consequently, historical 
sociologists became interested in social and economic conditions in Iran before and 
during the Constitutional Revolution, and how those conditions fit into existing models 
of social change. Much like the Whigs who preceded them, historical sociologists 
attempted to fit the Constitutional Revolution into models adapted from European 
history.  
 Nikki Keddie and Said Amir Arjomand made the two biggest contributions to 
the study of the Constitutional Revolution from historical sociology. These authors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Hobsbawm, On History, 78.	  	  
5 Ervand Abrahamian, “The Cause of the Constitutional Revolution,” International Journey of Middle 
East Studies 10, no. 3 (August, 1979): 382. 
	  
 7	  
attempted to use sociological tools and concepts to explain political and social change 
in Iranian history. In their search for the root cause of political change, these authors 
looked to the 1979 Islamic Revolution for lessons. Consequently, they were concerned 
with the role of religion and religious institutions. During the 1960’s and 1970’s, when 
Keddie was writing some of her most important works like The Origins of the Radical-
ʿUlama Alliance, Islamist and leftist political groups were increasingly challenging the 
Western-oriented Pahlavi dynasty. Shiʿism seemed to be largely concerned with 
limiting state power, with the ʿulama largely acting as the true representatives of the 
people. However, after the 1979 Revolution and the consolidation of power in the hands 
of clerics, these claims rang hallow. Authors like Arjomand would attribute such 
statements to authors who uncritically consumed revolutionary propaganda.6 These two 
authors in particular engaged in a prolonged and detailed debate over the meaning of 
Shiʿi Islam and the beliefs of the ʿulama, but largely agreed that the beliefs of average 
Iranians were determined by Shi’a Islam as interpreted by the ‘ulama.  
 Nikki Keddie adopted a marxian framework to explain political change in Iran. 
Keddie saw the Constitutional Revolution as the product of both socio-political factors 
and religious ideology.7 Keddie’s analysis focused on the behavior of two groups, the 
traditional urban merchants and the ʿulama. The traditional urban merchants, who 
increasingly suffered from the monopolies and tax-exemptions granted to foreign firms, 
were deeply opposed to the Qajar shahs. The ʿulama, largely dependent on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Said Amir Arjomand. The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1984), 23.	  
7 Nikki Keddie, “Religion, Society, and Revolution in Modern Iran,” in Modern Iran: The Dialectics of 
Continuity and Change, ed. Michael E. Bonine and Nikki Keddie (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1981), 25. 
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patronage of merchants, acted to protect their patrons through protests against various 
concessions (The Reuters Concession of 1872, the Tobacco Protests of 1890, and finally 
the protests against a sugar concession in 1905 which led to the Constitutional 
Revolution). The ʿulama were able to mobilize support because they were held in 
universal esteem by the people of Iran and represented their interests against the Qajar 
shahs. For Keddie, the doctrine of the Imamate led to an innate hostility of the Shia 
ʿulama to any temporal authority. The ʿulama were inherently hostile to the Qajars and 
had a class interest in deposing them. This confluence of class interest and ideology was 
what resulted in the Constitutional Revolution.  
 Said Amir Arjomand challenged Keddie’s characterization of Shia ideology and 
ʿulama behavior, while largely accepting her view of Qajar society as dominated by 
Shiʿism and the ʿulama. Arjomand adopted an explicitly Weberian framework and 
sought to understand political change inside of Iran by examining the interaction of 
material interest and ideology. While Keddie saw Shiʿism as inherently opposed to 
temporal authority, Arjomand made a forceful argument for change in Shia thought 
over time. By the time of the Qajar dynasty, the Usuli School was dominant and largely 
acted to legitimate Qajar authority and encourage quietism in “the masses.” For 
Arjomand, the ʿulama were zealous protectors of their own interests, which they saw as 
synonymous with the state. He agreed with Keddie that western intrusion motivated 
their support for the Constitutional Revolution, but emphasized military failures and the 
curtailment of ‘ulama authority over foreigners. The ‘ulama held these interests 
themselves and not by proxy in the bazaar. 
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 Keddie and Arjomand engaged in a long and lively debate over the nature of 
Shia Islam. This debate will be covered in depth in the second chapter, but suffice it to 
say it foregrounded three problems with the study of Iranian society. One, to what 
extent can we take at face value the statements of ʿulama, who were either patronized 
by the Qajars or fearful of retribution? Two, are the statements of the ʿulama 
synonymous with the beliefs of their followers? Three, what was the role of religion in 
Iran society? Social historians, influenced by this debate and by events going on in Iran, 
would attempt to answer these questions by studying in-depth the composition and 
beliefs of Iranian society. 
 A major downside of Arjomand’s and Keddie’s work was its inability to explain 
the behavior of Iran’s many religious and ethnic minorities. Iran’s tribes had their own 
Sheikh’s and followed Sufi traditions. Iran’s Christians (Assyrian and Armenian), Jews, 
and Zoroastrians were also left outside of the narrative. Historical sociologists, in part 
due to when they were writing and their emphasis on Shia Islam, largely ignored these 
groups. However, social historians would also address this gap in the literature.  
 
Social History  
 Unlike historical sociologists and Whigs, social historians looked at history 
“from below.” 8 In this way, the history of society or social change could not simply be 
the “backward projection of sociology.”9 English historians like E.P. Thompson and 
Eric Hobsbawm began to focus on the role of culture and the agency of workers 
themselves in making their own culture. This marked a move away from the study of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Hobsbawm, On History ,201. 
9 Ibid., 77. 
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economic forces, towards a study of communal relations and culture.  Three scholars in 
particular, Ervand Abrahamian (writing largely from the late 60’s to the early 90’s), 
Mangol Bayat (writing during the 1980’s and 1990’s), and Janet Afary (whose seminal 
work was published in 1996) made significant contributions to our understanding of 
Iranian society. Reflecting larger shifts in European academia, scholars of Iran became 
increasingly interested in studying the social conditions of Iran leading up to the 
Constitutional Revolution. Much as was the case in European historiography, this 
process began with economic history. Charles Issawi’s The Economic History of Iran 
1800-1914 was an important step in this process, as were a number of edited volumes 
by Nikki Keddie.10 However, the 1979 Revolution would interrupt this process and have 
a complicating effect on the study of the Constitutional Revolution.  
 The 1979 Revolution happened just as scholars were seriously delving into the 
social history of Iran, delaying and distracting research. In 1983, Iranian Studies finally 
published an issue devoted to the economic and social history of Iran. The issue had 
been scheduled to come out earlier, but was “delayed by the disruptions caused by the 
Iranian Revolution and its consequences.”11 These consequences included the 
immediate need to address the Constitutional Revolution and the suspension of research 
by U.S. academics in Iran.  
 Ervand Abrahamian’s Iran: Between Two Revolutions, demonstrated the effect 
the Revolution had on the structure of Iranian history. Abrahamian’s book was 
explicitly inspired by E.P. Thompson’s foundational social history text, The Making of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Charles Issawi, The Economic History of Iran 1800-1914 (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1971).	  
11 Naser Pakdaman, “Preface,” Iranian Studies 16, no. 3-4 (Summer-Autumn, 1983): 125.	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the English Working Class. It represented a major advancement in the field’s 
understanding of the social basis of political power in Qajar society. However, as the 
title suggests, the book was now obliged to contextualize any study of Iranian society 
with reference to these two events. Abrahamian’s work focused increasingly on 
contemporary Iranian society, especially the ideological and political effects of the 1979 
Revolution.   
 Bayat and Afary would continue to build on Abrahamian’s legacy and 
contribute to the history of the left in Iran. Methodologically, they were also similar to 
Abrahamian. They used a variety of memoirs, newspapers, and commentaries published 
in Iran to expand on the “history of the losers.” Bayat and Afary wrote as conservative 
Islamist forces consolidated their control over Iranian society. In many ways, theirs was 
a revisionist history, largely contradicting dominant narratives of an Iranian society 
synonymous with Shiʿi Islam.  
 Social history, while compelling in its detail, was increasingly difficult to do for 
Iran. We can only acknowledge the particular groups or individuals in “the crowd” if 
they were documented. Further, the sources that document them only become sources 
“because someone has asked a question and then prospected desperately around for 
some way-any way-of answering it.”12 Thus, there is deliberateness to social history, in 
that scholars must ask or look for particular sources instead of being presented with 
them. The perspective of the average or common person must be reconstructed from 
archives that normally focus on political elites. Scholars have looked to domestic 
Iranian politics and historical sociology to provide a model of what Iranian society 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Hobsbawm, On History, 205.	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should or has always looked like. In the case of Iranian politics, the 1979 revolution 
offered an irresistible point of comparison to the case of 1906, which emphasized the 
role of religion in Iran. Historical sociology offered a variety of concepts and theories to 
understand social and political change. By focusing on particular factors or actors, 
historical sociology also allowed for the experience of the Constitutional Revolution to 
be directly compared to other cases. But, as social history began to demonstrate the 
complexities and diversity of the Iranian society at in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century, scholars increasingly wrote narrower monographs. As scholars 
became increasingly interested in minority or non-dominant perspectives, works on the 
Constitutional Revolution have become increasingly vertical, addressing one group or 
aspect of the Constitutional Revolution. Thus, despite decades of study, scholars of the 
Constitutional Revolution are still deeply divided about the structure of Iranian society 
on the verge of the Revolution and its relationship to social and political change.  
 
Recent Research  
 Unlike the dramatic and stormy 1970’s and 1980’s, recent histories have been 
more modest, gradually setting the stage for perhaps a next phase in Iranian history. In 
particular, these authors have suggested a possible synthesis of social history and 
historical sociology. Mansour Bonakdarian’s work looked at the connections between 
pro-Constitutional forces in the U.K. and Iran. However, Bonakdarian made no 
pretension that these like-minded individuals were representative of their societies. On a 
more basic level, he does not try to explain the behavior of foreign policy dissenters in 
Britain or Constitutional activists in Iran in reference to a specific theory or 
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understanding of the culture of their country of origin. Vanessa Martin’s Iran Between 
Islamic Nationalism and Secularism: The Constitutional Revolution of 1906 also makes 
important distinctions about the nature of Iranian society, pointing to the deep regional 
variations in Iranian society.13 She also pointed out the current debates over the role of 
religion in Iranian society assume that concepts largely originating from Europe had 
resonance in larger Iranian society. While ultimately agreeing with past 
characterizations of Qajar Iran as a deeply religious society, she also pointed to regional 
and class variation in belief.  
 This brief survey of the historiography of the Constitutional Revolution pointed 
out three key themes: the question of global connections, the role of the ʿulama and 
Shiʿism, and the role of ethnic minorities. These three issues speak to fundamental 
issues of how scholarship defines Iran and classifies its history. Scholarship on the 
global dimension of the Constitutional Revolution has been dominated by historical 
sociology. This is understandable. Historical sociologists have a framework and set of 
concepts that allow aspects of the Constitutional Revolution to be compared to similar 
events and process across the world. However, these theories of social change largely 
focus on one aspect of the Constitutional Revolution and then use it as a point of 
comparison. The ʿulama and Shiʿism provide another explanation for the Constitutional 
Revolution, which reflects both social and sociology approaches. Further, ethnic 
minorities, though largely acknowledged as important part of Iranian society and the 
Constitutional Revolution, have remained only partially integrated into the scholarship. 
The key task for future scholars will be to increase our understanding of the causes of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Vannessa Martin, Iran Between Islamic Nationalism and Secularism: The Constitutional Revolution of 
1906 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013). 
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social change in Iranian society. 
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Chapter One  
The Constitutional Revolution as a Global Phenomenon: Whig History, Historical 
Sociology, and Transnational History 
 
The scholarship relating to the “global” aspects of the Constitutional Revolution 
provides the clearest opportunity to examine varying views of social change in the 
historiography of the Constitutional Revolution. Whig, historical sociology, and 
transnational approaches all brought different understanding of the history of society or 
social change to their study of the Constitutional Revolution. Authors who made the 
revolution “global” focused on a particular aspect of the Revolution that bore 
similarities to events in other parts of the world. The Whig history of Brown 
emphasized the revolution as a “national” awakening similar to the Glorious Revolution 
in England or the French Revolution. Historical sociologists viewed the Revolution as 
part of Iran’s transition into modernity. Marxian scholars emphasized economic 
changes in Iran as driving political and social changes, while Weberians such as 
Arjomand emphasized ideological changes. However, both agreed that the 
Constitutional Revolution was part of the universal or global pattern of social 
progression from traditional to modern society. The linguistic turn of the 1980’s and 
1990’s criticized the determinism implicit in these models. Transnational scholars 
attempted to look at the exchange of ideas and texts in a global context and its political 
affect. In particular, they focused on an emerging global community of revolutionaries 
and intellectuals.  This section, more than any other, will focus on the role of sociology 
or the history of society in the historiography of the Constitutional Revolution.  
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Theories of social change helped explain why the Constitutional Revolution 
happened when and how it did. The very title of “revolution” denotes that that what 
happened in 1905 was more than a riot brought on by speculation or urban discontent. 
Rather, the Constitutional Revolution marked a change in the structure of Iranian 
society. Each of the schools discussed above identified different actors and forces as the 
driving force behind social change in Iran. However, these schools had to assume a 
“system of behavior or thought- and one which can be, in some senses, inferred once we 
know the basic social assumptions, parameters, and tasks of the situation, but before we 
know very much about that situation.”1 This starting assumption is about human nature 
and is therefore global. This basic system of thought would serve as the basis for 
understanding all human behavior and for the progression of history. It allows for 
comparisons of human action across time, space, and culture. Without it, all history 
would be micro-history and based on the mentality or perspective of individuals. At 
best, history would be confined to a place, a time, and a culture. But even then, 
assumptions would have to be made about the shared mentality of all members of a 
community. Without assumptions about a shared human mentality, history would 
become a daunting exercise. The danger in such an approach is that is becomes a 
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Browne and Whig History 
Browne’s The Persian Revolution reflected Browne’s conflicting position as an 
“Orientalist in the service of the Orient” and a Whig historian.2 His account of the 
Constitutional Revolution was overwhelmingly sympathetic and meant to counter 
depictions of the constitutionalists as disorganized brigands in the British Tory press. 
This debate in the British press largely mirrored debates in the British government over 
whether to support the constitutionalists or the Qajars and whether the British Empire 
was a moral exercise. However, in trying to make Iran deserving of the sympathy of the 
British public, he engaged in a kind of essentialism of a romantic and idealized 
“Persian” nation.3 Iran became deserving of independence and equality in the 
international system in so much as it reflected these characteristics and was similar to or 
connected to European or Western culture. History was left with a detailed account of 
the Constitutional Revolution, but one that was ultimately a product of its time and the 
political intentions of the author.  
 Browne’s narrative of the Constitutional Revolution focused on the event as a 
national one, but profoundly affected by its international context. The Constitutional 
Revolution was “global” in so much as it was part of a historical progression towards 
nation states and was affected by geostrategic rivalry between the Russian and British 
empires. Browne focused his analysis on the Iranian nation and its status as a great 
culture. He made events in Iran part of a global narrative of progress towards a nation 
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3 Abbas Amanat, “Introduction,” in The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909, by Edward Granville Browne 




state system. He contextualized this inside a global system of imperial geostrategic 
rivalry that has supported the tyranny inside of Iran.  
Browne contextualized the Constitutional Revolution in a moral universe 
characterized by a global system of geopolitical rivalry and colonial expansion. 
Browne’s history reflected his general hatred of imperialism and his work as the leading 
supporter of the Iranian Constitutionalist cause in Great Britain.4 This comes through 
clearly in The Persian Revolution. Browne wrote of anticolonial movements in Egypt, 
China, and Iran as “the rising of the patient millions against the exploitation of an 
unscrupulous West.”5 He exhorted the “independent Muslim States” to combine “to 
withstand the constant aggression of the European Powers”6 and “any Mohammedan 
potentate who encourages or acquiesces in, an extension of Western influence in his 
domains must be regarded by the promoters of this movement as an enemy to the 
cause” of restoring the former glory and power of Islam.7 The “Persian nation” was 
denied its rightful place of political equality among nations because of the imperial 
ambitions of Russian and Great Britain and their resulting manipulation of the Qajar 
monarchy. For Browne, this moral claim to the equality of all “great nations” is meant 
to override the “realpolitik” or geostrategic considerations of projecting British imperial 
power through a dependent client state or acquiescing to Russian gains in northern Iran 
in the name of maintaining an alliance with Russia.8  
The Constitutional Revolution was part of a progression to an international 
system of nation states. Browne wrote that Iran’s current situation was like that of 
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5 Edward Granville Browne, The Persian revolution of 1905-1909 (Washington: Mage. 2006), 122-123. 
6 Ibid., 30. 
7 Browne, The Persian revolution of 1905-1909, 97. 
8 Amanat, “Introduction,” X. 
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England under Charles II of France under Louis XVI, namely a vibrant nation held back 
by a despotic and incompetent government. Further, “to judge fairly the Persia of to-
day, we must think of her as we think of England in the reign of Charles the First, or of 
France in the reign of Louis the Sixteenth, but an England without a Cromwell, a France 
without a Danton.”9 While ultimately deserving of a state, the Iranian nation suffered 
from a backward system of political organization. As his selection of Cromwellian 
England and Republican France suggested, the correct or modern model of governance 
was characterized by parliamentary democracies that centralized power and attempted 
to rationalize society.  
Great Britain and Russia entered the narrative primarily as the promoters of 
despotism whose abuse “awaken[ed]” the Iranian nation. Browne saw the Qajars as 
incompetent and tools of British and Russian interests, exemplified by their willingness 
to enter into a series of disastrous concessions and loans. However, the protests over the 
Reuter and tobacco concessions were the first sign of the “awakening” of the Iranian 
people. These protests were the beginning of “the national awakening of which we are 
still watching the development” and demonstrated that “there was a limit to what 
Persians would endure, that they were not spiritless creatures which they had been 
supposed to be, and that henceforth they would have to be reckoned with.”10 The 
Constitutional Revolution was certainly affected by the imperial rivalry of Great Britain 
and Russia, but it was fundamentally about the Iranian nation imposing its sovereignty 
in reaction to domestic despotism.  
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 Great Britain and Russia were also cultural examples of Iran to emulate as 
examples of modernity while pursuing policies that enabled the oppressive regime of 
the Qajars. This reflects a tension in The Persian Revolution between Browne’s 
sympathy for the Constitutionalists and his inflexible and Eurocentric Whig framework. 
Browne’s “great men” of the Constitutional Revolution, Jalal-ud Din Al-Afghani and 
Malkom Khan, spent considerable time in Europe. They were able to benefit from 
western education and exposure to western methods of governance. Despite being an 
avowed enemy of liberal reform, Russia also had an effect in encouraging reform. The 
Russian Revolution of 1905 had a “most astounding effect” in Iran. “Events in Russia 
have been watched with great attention, and a new spirit would seem to have come over 
the people. They are tired of their rulers, and, taking example of Russia, have come to 
think that it is possible to have another and better form of government.”11 So, while 
Browne characterized the Chinese revolution as having a nativist tendency “towards the 
ideal of China for the Chinese”, Iran’s awakening, “owing to its proximity to Russia, 
would appear to take the form of a movement towards democratic reform.”12 This 
distinction was important for Browne. The Constitutional Revolution was not simply a 
nativist or nationalistic reaction against foreign (i.e. Western) influence, like the Boxer 
Rebellion. Instead, the Constitutional Revolution was part of a movements, originating 
in France and England, towards liberal democracy. But while Browne is clear to see 
Iran as part of a global history centered on nations, and to even see these movements as 
influenced by one another, national awakenings primarily reflect the unique character of 
each nation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid., 120. 
12 Browne, The Persian revolution of 1905-1909, 122. 
	  
 21	  
 Browne’s analysis of the Constitutional Revolution ultimately centers on a 
culturally homogenous Iranian nation. Browne sees the Iranian nation as possessing a 
great culture deserving of its own nation state. Iran is one of the “exceptional races, 
such as the Greeks in Europe, [who] have contributed so much to the spiritual, 
intellectual, and artistic wealth of the human race that they have an exceptional claim on 
our sympathies, and that their submergence must be reckoned a calamity with no 
expediency can justify.”13 Further, Iran is still “inhabited by a people still wonderfully 
homogenous...and still arguably resembling their ancient forebearers” and that “no 
amount of material prosperity...can compensate the world, spiritually or intellectually, 
for the loss of Persia.”14 Iran is so unique, that its “development” along British or 
Russian colonial lines, would represent a loss to humanity. Browne’s purpose here was 
two fold. One, he was trying to portray Iranians as a nation deserving its own state and 
capable of self-overning. Two, he was making a moral claim that the cultural 
importance of Iran was more important than any benefit, to Iran or Great Britain, that 
could come from colonial administration. The Iranian nation could emulate the West on 
its own, without having to be colonized and remade in the West’s image.  
 Browne’s narrative was more descriptive than theoretical and did not offer a 
clear explanation of the causes of the Constitutional Revolution. Despite his emphasis 
on the importance of the Iranian nation to the Constitutional Revolution, Browne never 
outlined a theory of nationalism. There was no detailed causal description of how ideas 
of national sovereignty manifest themselves into mass politics. The closest he came to 
this is an essentialized notion of Iranian culture that emphasized its similarity to Europe. 
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In the later half of the twentieth century, historians tried to use historical sociology to 
answer these questions.  
 
Historical Sociology 
 The move towards sociological explanations of historical events reflected 
broader shifts in historical sociology. In the case of Iran, marxian sociology was 
particularly influential. This vein of historical sociology emphasized the encounter 
between traditional Iranian society and capitalism. Unlike the Whig history of Browne, 
which relied on an essentialized and homogenous vision of the Iranian nation, marxian 
historical sociologists sought to break down society along class lines. In this way, 
nations were neither static nor homogeneous, but were affected by changes in the 
overall system of economic production, which sorted individuals into different classes 
based on their relationship to the means of productions. This innovation had the 
important effect of trying to develop an objective and theoretically defined system of 
evaluating history. However, these historians assumed that the actions of Iranian were 
explained by class interest.   
For Nikki Keddie, Ervand Abrahamian, John Foran, and Janet Afary, the global 
dimension of the Constitutional Revolution was primarily economic and focused on the 
integration of Iran into a global system of capitalism. Though the careers of these four 
authors span the later half of the twentieth century, the works examined here were 
published in the early 80’s and 90’s. These authors wrote in the historical sociology 
tradition and examined Iranian history using marxian criticism. These authors agreed 
that the Constitutional Revolution was defined by a class conflict caused by the 
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industrialization of Iranian society and the adoption of a capitalist mode of production. 
This created social frictions by disrupting the traditional modes of production, 
alienating traditional artisans and bazaaris from their livelihood. These approaches 
focused on the development of an integrated national economy and the development of 
classes based on their relationship to the means of productions, while at the same time 
developing the transportation and communication infrastructure necessary for these 
grievances to be expressed on a national level. While Iran’s encounter with capitalism 
and industrialization was the most important factor in social change, these authors also 
recognized local cultural and ideological influences on how class differences manifested 
themselves politically. These social scientific accounts were more “globalized” than 
their Whig predecessors in that they emphasized how Iran’s society was affected by 
international processes. However, these histories still concentrated on a single, Iranian 
nation demarcated by its national borders.  
 The historical sociologists contextualized the Constitutional Revolution in a 
time of growing global economic integration driven by colonialism. The particular 
mechanics of this structure varied from Foran and Afary's use of Dependency Theory to 
Abrahamian and Keddie use of a “Marxian” or neo-Marxist framework. Keddie and 
Abrahamian emphasized Iran’s position as an “exploited semi-colony of more than one 
power.”15 The Qajars were so dependent on income and protection from outside powers 
that, “Iranian rulers did not even undertake the elementary self-strengthening and 
bureaucratization that characterizes most Middle Eastern Governments.”16 Similarly, 
Abrahamian wrote that Western pressures “began as early as 1800, and took the form of 
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military pressure first from the Russians” but also from the British in the Anglo-Persian 
War of 1857.17 The resulting treaties were unequal and granted extraterritorial 
privileges to British and Russian merchants that gave them an unfair advantage over the 
Iranian bazaari class. Foran and Afary agreed also emphasized Iran’s “dependent 
development” that prevented Iran from industrializing in the same way as Britain and 
Russia. Iran was integrated into a global capitalist system in which it would always be a 
peripheral supplier of raw goods, which locked Iran into an unequal global position.18 
The concessions and loans were not the source of despotism, but were one of the ways 
Iran was opened to the global economy and its accompanying economic and social 
dislocations.   
The role of Great Britain and Russia was primarily to open Iran to the global 
economy and to integrate it into the global capitalist economy. The historical 
sociologists saw the primary means of forcing open the Iranian economy as the various 
unequal treaties and concessions granted by the Qajars. Abrahamian wrote that the 
treaty of Gulistan (1813) and the treaty Turkomanchai (1828) “exempted [British and 
Russian] merchants not only from the high import duties but also from internal tariffs, 
local travel restrictions, and the jurisdiction of the shariʿa law courts.”19 This increased 
competition from European traders forced Iranian merchants to seek “new sources of 
revenue and turned toward agricultural land.” The resulting “foreign demand for raw 
materials, and the profitable market for opium and other cash crops transformed the 
country’s economy.” Eventually, “the great majority of smaller merchants lost both 
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foreign and internal markets to Russian and British companies and became agents and 
employees working for European firms.”20 This narrative began where Browne left off 
and explained in detail the mechanisms by which the “nation” became politically active. 
However, for these authors the primary actor was not a single nation, but a traditional 
middle class composed of artisans and bazaaris.  
The historical sociologists saw the Constitutional Revolution as primarily about 
a national class struggle involving the traditional middle class in cooperation with a 
variety of other classes. Keddie famously emphasized the alliance between disaffected 
bazaaris and the clerics they patronized in creating the basis for a political alliance 
capable of mobilizing the masses.21 Abrahamian saw this alliance as actually two 
middle classes, a propertied middle class composed of the Ulama and Bazaar, and a 
“intelligentsia” that included individuals from different segments of society but who 
subscribed to western, positivist thought.22 Foran, building on both Keddie and 
Abrahamian, categorized the revolutionary alliance as “a mixed alliance in terms of 
classes and their constituent modes of production” and consisted of “artisans, 
intelligentsia, and workers, and some merchants, ulama, and marginalized urban 
classes” but emphasized the leading role of artisans and intelligentsia.23 Though Afary 
used Dependency Theory extensively to contextualize her narrative, she did not explain 
the internal political dynamics of the revolution purely in terms of class. She pointed to 
ideological divisions within classes and the importance of gender and ethnicity in 
explaining these difference. Further, she highlights the role of peasant revolts 
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(especially in Gilan), challenging the traditional view of peasants as a reactionary or 
non-participatory class. Despite these differences, these authors do agree that the 
Constitutional Revolution was in large part a result of economic processes alienating 
traditional society from the state. To what extent this also alienated the clergy or 
modern intellectuals whose interests overlapped with the traditional middle class was 
unclear. Whatever its composition, the constitutional movement was focused primarily 
on replacing the Qajars and modernizing the Iranian state. 
Despite the emphasis on class conflict, the primary goal of the Constitutional 
Revolution was national modernization. As Keddie wrote, “The revolutionaries in 1905-
1911 disliked Russian and British encroachments, but their main wrath was directed 
against the Qajar dynasty and its inability to organize a strong and functioning state and 
nation.”24 Or, as Abrahamian put it “both the traditional middle class and the modern 
intelligentsia, despite their differences, were directing their attacks at the same target-
the central government.”25 Foran also pointed out that although there was a strong anti-
foreign element to the protests, the focus of the protests was still on the interests of “the 
popular social base” of the revolution. The demands of the Constitutional Revolution 
were focused on domestic politics even if it reflected global economic processes.26 
Further, these authors did not explain the political behavior of the Constitutionalist 
coalition in terms of marxist ideology, but by invoking a “revolutionary” Iranian or 
Islamic character.  
 The social scientists ultimately engaged in some sort of social history to explain 
how the revolution succeeded. As Keddie wrote,  “there is almost surely something in 
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Islamic content that influences the form and ideology of movements in different parts of 
the Muslim world, even lacking direct contact”27 and cites “Iran’s cultural identity”28 as 
an additional lens which determined how social friction manifested itself politically. 
Similarly, Abrahamian wrote, “it was these radical concepts of the modern middle class, 
together with anti-state Shia ideas of the traditional middle class, that helped bring 
about the eventual triumph of the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911.”29 While 
Afary and Foran emphasized the international connections of the Constitutional 
Revolutions, they also wrote that “dependence was an economic process but one that 
had far-reaching political consequences, and was experienced and filtered through the 
value systems and cultural beliefs.”30  Similarly, Afary attempted to show that “culture, 
ideology, and politics are not merely reflections of the economic and technological 
base, though they are influenced by and, in turn, influence the social and economic 
structures.”31 Thus, while these authors saw the Constitutional Revolution as primarily a 
result of global economic changes, the ultimate form the pro-constitution coalition took 
was influenced by national or local culture.  
 Historical sociology highlighted important processes, but relied on a particular 
notion of Iranian society to interpret these processes. While Iranian society was clearly 
affected by economic changes brought on by the penetration of Western capitalism and 
industrialization, how these changes manifested in political organization depended on 
Iranian culture. As all these authors pointed out, the Constitutional coalition was a 
mixed one, incorporating both Western-inspired intellectuals and traditionally minded 
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ʿulama and bazaaris. While intellectuals may have been familiar with Marx and other 
critically minded writings, to what extent did their traditionally minded colleagues share 
this understanding? Did the majority of Iranians understand events in Iran from the 
same materialist perspective? Was the Constitutional Revolution a product of 
revolutionary agitation, religious fervor, or some combination of the two? An important 
part of this puzzle was to understand the role of revolutionaries and intellectuals. 
Transnational intellectuals and revolutionaries seemed to provide an answer as to how 
ideas of revolution were transmitted and mediated from Europe to Iran. 
 
Transnational History  
 Transnational history has attempted to reconcile seemingly contradictory 
linguistic or cultural approaches to history with the economic narratives of historical 
sociology. The 1970’s and 1980’s saw the rise of “cultural” or “linguistic” criticisms of 
the historical sociology approach to history. This criticism focused on “the social 
science preoccupation with large scale, anonymous structures and processes which 
neglected the life experiences of the ordinary person” as well as “the theory of 
modernization that assumed that the world would follow the pattern set by the West” 
and the historical sociology’s commitment “to empirical, including quantitative, studies 
and the belief that these studies could offer objective knowledge.”32 In place of 
scientific certainty arose the belief “that the culture of the group, and even the will of 
the individual, are potentially at least as important causal agents of change as the 
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impersonal forces of material output and demographic growth.”33 Economics was not 
ignored, but it was not treated with the same sense of determinism of inevitability that 
characterized historical sociology inquiry. Rather, its effects were considered culturally 
and linguistically contingent.  
Charles Kurtzman, Nader Sohrabi, and Mansour Bonakdarian’s work reflected 
the “cultural” or “linguistic” turn to varying extents. Their work, published between 
2006 and 2011, did not deny the importance of economic processes, but did not 
consider it a sufficient master narrative. Instead, they focused on how culture and 
language influenced economics and vice versa. Using the writings of notable 
individuals and contemporary newspapers, these authors sought to examine how 
existing language and culture constrained how events were interpreted. This movement 
away from the homogenizing narrative of economics and the nation-state did not 
preclude these authors from addressing global themes. Quite the opposite, by blurring 
the physical borders of nations and highlighting the diversity inside of nations, recent 
scholarship was able to globalize the narrative of the Constitutional Revolution in a 
broader fashion than the social scientists.  
Recent scholarship has focused on a global intellectual class and contextualized 
the Constitutional Revolution in terms of systems of transnational cultural exchange. 
Authors like Kurtzman, Sohrabi, and Bonakdarian were concerned with how 
transnational linkages between different groups facilitated the Constitutional 
Revolution. Social scientists had always acknowledged the role of intellectuals in Iran 
who promoted a strong, centralized government along European lines as the solution to 
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Iran’s domestic and foreign problems. However, rather than focusing on homogeneity 
inside of national borders, these authors focused on how different cultures or groups 
transcended national borders. These histories are the most “global” in that they did not 
confine their analysis to the physical borders of a nation or assign certain immutable 
characteristic to a national culture. Kurtzman contended that the traditional emphasis of 
historical sociology on “the bourgeoisie, the working class, and the middle class” is 
misguided as “these characters played their roles inconsistently.”34 Rather, he pointed to 
“the emerging global class of modern intellectuals” inspired by the positivist ideology 
of Auguste Comte who espoused democracy as a “self-interested ideology for 
intellectuals of the early twentieth century.”35 Sohrabi built on this and saw that the 
“global diffusion of constitutionalism prompted similar demands” from frustrated, 
western educated intellectuals in both the Iranian and Ottoman revolutions.36 
Bonakdarian engaged in perhaps the most global of all the histories of the 
Constitutional Revolution, blurring the line between “East” and “West” and between 
Iran and Britain. Specifically, he described “protracted cross cultural encounters” were 
“production of knowledge and assumptions about the Other do not remain 
predetermined by prior, distinct cultural parameters and suppositions about Self and 
Other, even if that knowledge is ultimately filtered through the familiar cultural lense of 
the observer.”37 In this process of exchange between nations, it becomes clear that the 
perspective of the state did not represent the perspective of all groups in a nation.   
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 Great Britain and Russia, and the West generally, where evaluated not as 
monoliths, but as collection of different groups and individuals who had very different 
opinions and relationships to the Constitutional Revolution. Sohrabi highlighted the 
notion of “global time” and the singular availability of the French Revolutionary 
model.38 Sohrabi linked the Constitutional Revolution to the democratic wave “that 
swept across Russia in 1905, Mexico in 1910, China in 1911” which “in turn were part 
of a much broader long-term wave of democratic movements in England, America, and 
France, a wave that continued with the 1848 revolutions in Europe.”39 Krutzman also 
linked Iran to the revolutionary wave of 1905-1911. He also pointed out that the British 
response was not monolithic. Diplomats in the British Legation permitted the bast on 
Legation grounds despite the protests of London. The official British decision to refuse 
“to allow Russian troops to advance on Tehran” was evidence of how “Great Power 
competition temporarily aided the pro democracy forces in Iran.”40  Bonakdarian 
elaborated on the ambiguity pointed out by Kurtzman and convincingly demonstrated 
how “foreign policy dissenters” in British government and society affected British 
foreign policy and gave important aid to the Constitutionalists. Further, he demonstrated 
the ambiguity not only in official British policy, but also in British society and the 
Orientalist scholarship. He saw a series of linkages between “British and other 
‘Western’/European progressive foreign-policy dissenters and/or anti-imperialists, on 
the one hand, and nationalists and reformers in the weaker independent countries and 
colonized territories, on the other hand, that more balanced and sympathetic future 
dialogues would emerge between different sides” and that this process is an ongoing 
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one.41 Unlike Sohrabi and Kurtzman, Bonakdarian used his narrative to highlight a 
global relationship that transcends a particular time or place. These authors rely on texts 
to explain the ideology and mindset of individuals and groups.    
 The focus of these narratives was on how ideas of revolution and modernity are 
transmitted and ultimately adopted by constitutionalists. Kurtzman’s portrayal featured 
the least amount of mediation and the most reliance on class interest to explain action. 
For Kurtzman, intellectuals are distinct from the middle classes, and espouse an 
ideology that advocates their enlightened rule of society.42 He emphasized the role of 
Malkom Khan in bringing Comtean positivism to Iran and its popularity among 
western-educated elites out of class interest. Intellectuals had to adapt this ideology and 
therefore “preferred more often to emphasize the coincidence of their own interests and 
the interests of the nation as a whole.”43 Sohrabi and Bonakdarian were much more 
skeptical about the connection between class interest and ideology, but agreed with 
Kurtzman that constitutionalists were engaged in a similar game of using national 
language and symbols of legitimacy to promote their political program.  Sohrabi 
pointed to the “paradigm of kingship” and localization of constitutionalism with 
“Islamization to garner legitimacy.” This tussle between competing local conceptions of 
legitimacy “informed a good part of the dynamics of the confrontations with the 
monarchy or support for the Assembly, and it cannot be reduced to an appendage of the 
struggle of the legislative against the executive, a movement for radical democracy, or 
social democracy, or a fight over religion.”44  Bonakdarian places similar emphasis on 
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ideology and language, but rather than emphasizing a local language or culture, he 
emphasizes an international process of exchange between like-minded individuals in the 
West/Europe and individuals in colonial nationalists movements.45  Unlike Browne or 
historical sociology, the Constitutional Revolution in these narratives is contingent on 
delicate cultural interactions. These narratives ultimately rely on a particular definition 
of Iranian culture, accessed primarily through textual evidence, in order to explain the 
course of the Constitutional Revolution.  
 These later works see the Constitutional Revolution in a more global context, 
but one that still relies on social history. For transnational scholars, both the economic 
processes affecting Iran and the culture that interpreted those events was the product of 
global linkages and exchange. However, transnational scholar focused on the life-word 
of Western-inspired intellectuals. They assumed that these global revolutionaries were 
the key class behind the Constitutional Revolution. This built on the work of historical 
sociology, which while acknowledging the importance of culture, saw cultural 
differences or divisions inside of society as less important than class divisions or as a 
product of them. However, class divisions clearly did not determine ideology, even if 
economic interests still influenced ideology. These authors emphasized how actors 
became socialized politically affects their ability to even acknowledge the importance 
of class or when the revolution occurs affects what revolutionary types are available to 
emulate.   
 Bonakdarian’s inquiry, like Sohrabi’s and Kurtzman’s, was fundamentally a 
comparative project. Other transnational or global linkages were mentioned (the 
influence of Caucasian revolutionaries or linkages to other nationalist struggles in 
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colonial or semi-colonized regions), but they were only present in so much as they 
explain fundamentally national events. Bonakdarian’s work did provide an example of 
what future scholarship of the Constitutional Revolution could be. His almost forensic 
approach to examining British involvement in the Constitutional Revolution revealed 
that British or Iranian interests or perceptions of the Constitutional Revolution were not 
only varied inside of these borders, but there was cooperation and exchange between 
groups in both countries. He used his own experiences with protests movement in the 
U.S to project this dialogue of like-minded individuals into the present. The next step is 
to examine the different groups that constituted the Iranian nation and then examine 




 These various schools of social theory substitute the perspective of a certain 
class for the perspective of all Iranians. The move is justified by reference to a notion of 
human nature. Browne assumed that Iranians desired an elected government that 
reflected the aspirations of the nation. Marxian social historians assumed that Iranian’s 
advocated for their particular class interest, while Arjomand and Bayat emphasized 
ideology. The emerging school of transnational history sought to address the 
shortcomings of previous schools. Rather than impose a particular mindset, 
transnational history sought to ground global processes and events in local or even 
individual experiences. They emphasized networks that transmitted ideas through texts 
and interactions. However, Sohrabi, Kurtzman, and Bonakdarian came, in their own 
way, to make the evidence fit their model. In their rush to find a transnational means of 
exchange, they emphasized the role of intellectuals and revolutionaries. These groups 
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formed a series of transnational networks that transmitted ideas and information. They 
formed a society of their own. However, were these revolutionaries truly representative 
of Iranian society? Were they the essential agent of change in Iran? The answer to these 
questions can only be found in studying Iranian society.  
 Scholars have relied on two ways to access the mentality of Iranian society, 
religion and ethnicity. Both are tempting ways to analyze the “essence” of Iranian 
character. Religion presents a set of beliefs and accompanying rituals that provide 
insight into the mentality of society. Similarly, ethnicity presents scholars with a culture 
and identity that explains political behavior. As will be discussed in the following two 
chapters, the study of religion (especially Shiʿi Islam) and ethnicity (especially the 
Azeris, Armenians, and Bakhtiyari tribe) has provided invaluable insight into the causes 
of the Constitutional Revolution and Iranian society. However, ethnicity and religion 




The role of the ʿUlama in the Constitutional Revolution: Between Sociology and 
Social History  
 
The historiography of the ʿulama in the Constitutional Revolution reflects two 
sets of tensions, one between sociology and social history and the other between the 
past and the present. These two tensions are related. Scholars have used 
contemporaneous understandings of Shiʿi Islam, based largely on the political situation 
in Iran, to guide their research into the ʿulama. While varying theories of sociology have 
tried to explain the relationship of religion to social and political change, they ultimately 
rely on a particular historical understanding of the role played by religion and its 
institutions in a given culture. This begs the question, how do we study religion? Is 
religion defined by the pronouncement of religious scholars or is it transmitted to 
adherents through participatory rituals? How can we truly the belief system of Iranian 
society during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when literary culture was 
confined to elites? Past scholars have resolved this tension by reference to the present. 
By using the current status of Shiʿism in Iranian society as a starting point, scholars 
could then “properly” interpret sources. The situation is analogous to that of the Marxist 
historians in examining grassroots history who supposed that the history of labor 
organization, which represented workers “could replace the history of the common 
people themselves.”1 In this way, the historiography of the ʿulama is linked both to the 
Constitutional Revolution and the 1979 Revolution.  
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Scholars have used contemporary understandings of Iran to define the “research 
problem” which they set out to solve. Hamid Algar, Anne Lambton, and Nikkie Keddie 
wrote many of their most important works before 1979, when the language and symbols 
of Shiʿi Islam pervaded revolutionary propaganda and many Shiʿi clerics were involved 
in anti-government activity. In particular, the dramatic 1963 protests in Qom (the center 
of theological learning in Iran) against a Status of Forces Agreement highlighted 
tensions between the ʿulama and the pro-West, modernizing monarchy of Muhammad 
Reza Pahlavi. During the Pahlavi dynasty (1924-1979), Iran seemed to be defined by 
conflict between an unpopular, autocratic government imposing Western-inspired 
reforms and a popular opposition movement led by the ʿulama. However, the post-
Revolutionary violence would challenge this narrative. Janet Afary, Mangol Bayat, 
Ervand Abrahamian, and Said Amir Arjomand largely wrote after 1979, when the 
revolution became associated with Islamism and the suppression of leftist and secular 
activists. Consequently, these authors no longer saw Shiʿism as otherworldly or 
synonymous with “justice.” Rather, they emphasized ʿulama accommodation with the 
Qajars, opposition to democracy, and hostility to administrative reforms. In their place, 
they emphasized the role of intellectuals, leftists, and heterodox Shiʿi in mobilizing 
protests and pushing for Constitutional reform. Recent works by Vanessa Martin and 
Mateo Farzaneh on the ʿulama have been mixed and cautious, mirroring the unclear 
legacy of Shiʿism in Iranian society. These anachronistic interpretations of the ‘ulama 
and Shi’ism then become the starting point or “research problem” for scholars to solve. 
However, the selection of a particular method represents yet another ambiguity for 
scholars.   
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The relationship of religion to social and political change has been a major 
theme in sociology. Historical sociologists, like Keddie and Arjomand, borrowed many 
of the concepts and theories of sociology to enrich their study of Iranian society. 
However, historical sociologists have had to deal with the temptation of “the wooden 
taking-over of unprocessed terminology and categories from one favored school of 
sociology, and imposing these upon existent historical knowledge.”2 Historical 
sociological approaches to the Constitutional Revolution, whether Marxian in the case 
of Keddie or Weberian in the case of Arjomand, were at risk of making historical 
knowledge fit their models, as opposed to using sociology to look at old problems in 
new ways. These theoretical models became deterministic, defining Iranian society 
rather than simply explaining social change in Iran. These approaches should be 
complementary, but because they are largely responsive to contemporary Iranian 
society, they are often contradictory.  
 
Browne: Mullahs as a Political Class 
Browne saw the ʿulama as politically important, but remained largely indifferent 
to the role of religion in Iranian society. Browne’s treatment of the ʿulama was the 
simplest, due in large part to the inability of his historical framework to deal with either 
religion or social history. Whig history judged the past with reference to the present and 
“through this system of immediate reference to the present day, historical personages 
can easily and irresistibly be classed into the men who tried to hinder it so that a hard 
rule of thumb exists by which a historian can select and reject, and make his point of 
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emphasis.”3 This dispensed with the issue balancing social history and sociology and 
favor of totally subordinating history to a master narrative. Browne’s history was also a 
function of Browne’s political sympathies and his contacts with the Constitutionalists. 
However, Browne’s account of the ʿulama raised a number of questions about the basis 
of ʿulama political power in Iranian society. 
The ʿulama were powerful because they had social prestige due to their role in 
daily life. For Browne , the clergy were “an essentially national class, sprung from the 
people, knowing the people, and, if suspicious of administrative innovations, yet more 
suspicious of foreign interference.”4 Browne  emphasized the daily interactions of the 
ʿulama with the people and their reliance on them for financial support and legitimacy, 
leading to their hostility to the Qajars and foreign intrusions. It was these connections 
which made the ‘ulama hostile to the Qajars and motivated them to ally themselves with 
Western-inspired reformers. The concessions to foreigner merchants, especially 
capitulations (the exemption of foreigners from Sharia courts) and the Qajars's nascent 
attempts at reform were threats to the authority of the ʿulama. Thus, the ʿulama’s anti-
foreign and anti-Qajar sentiment aligned well with the political program of 
“nationalists.” This closeness to the people also endowed the ‘ulama with tremendous 
political power. 
The participation of the ʿulama was essential to the success of the Tobacco 
Protests and the Constitutional Revolution in Whig narratives. In the case of the protests 
against the Tobacco Concession, Shiʿi clerics were “the real masters of the situation.”5 
Browne believed that “without the support of the Clergy the people could neither have 
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broken down the Tobacco Monopoly nor have extorted from the Shah a Constitution.”6 
The role of Islam and the clergy in these political uprising is primarily seen from the 
perspective of mobilization. While unequivocal in his recognition of the important role 
played by the clergy, Browne  saw the relationship between the two groups as tenuous, 
due to the secularizing reforms favored by the nationalists.  
The Revolution was inevitable. While Browne’s narrative is logically consistent, 
it does beg some basic questions. Browne saw the tension between the reforms 
proposed by the Majlis and the interests of the ʿulama. He wrote, “[i]f the reforms 
which the people, with their [ʿulama] help, have fought for become a reality, nearly all 
their power will be gone.”7 The ʿulama opposed the equality of all Iranian males before 
the law because they “strongly opposed any surrender of the privileges at present 
enjoyed by Muslims.” However, Browne saw the ʿulama as unable to resist the 
secularization because it was demanded by “the nation.” Inasmuch as the “popular 
party” represented the will of the nation, the ʿulama could only keep their influence by 
“moving with the people, and that opposition to the popular feeling would seriously 
damage or even utterly destroy their power.”8 This tension was solved by reference to 
an assumed inevitable direction to human, and therefore Iranian, history. The triumph of 
the nation was inevitable and not something which the ʿulama could resist.    
Browne’s top down view of the Constitutional Revolution was a product of his 
methodology and available sources. Browne knew many of the key personalities on the 
Constitutionalist side, who wanted to show that Russian and British imperial control 
was not necessary to stabilize Iran, but that Iranian nationalists already had a 
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“modernizing orientation” and that “constitutionalism and nationalism were not alien 
imports forced upon the Iranian society by a small group of Europeanized 
intellectuals.”9 He also had a number of former students in the Foreign Service, 
including the legation in Tehran. These personal connections, in conjunction with his 
knowledge of Persian literature and coverage from the Times, provided him with the 
necessary sources for a Whig History, largely concerned with political machinations. 
Browne hinted that the sources of ʿulama prestige lay in their role as educators, judges, 
and popular advocates. But Browne’s history left a number of questions unanswered. If 
the ʿulama were powerful, why then did they feel the need to ally themselves with 
“modernizers” who would only challenge their authority and interests? What did the 
‘ulama believe and what motivated them? Scholars in the 1960’s, who saw a similar 
alliance of intellectuals and the ʿulama protesting against the Shah, looked for an 
answer by examining the ʿulama’s role in popular spiritual life and their institutional 
interests.  
   
The Revolutionary ʿUlama:    
 Nikki Keddie, Hamid Algar, and Anne Lambton saw the ʿulama and Shiʿi Islam 
as inherently hostile to any temporal power and therefore prone to revolution. These 
scholars, who started writing during the tumultuous early period of Mohammad Reza 
Shah’s reign, saw Iranian society as divided between a Western, modernizing state and 
a religiously led opposition movement, striving for “justice.” With this in mind, Keddie, 
Lambton, and Algar saw the Constitutional Revolution primarily as a reaction of the 
ʿulama to the oppression and tyranny of the Qajars. For Keddie and Lambton, Qajar 
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repression and accommodation of foreign interests damaged the material interests of the 
ʿulama. Algar largely dismissed material motivations and focused more on the Imamate 
doctrine of the ʿulama, which supposedly declared all temporal authority during the 
occultation of the 12th Imam illegitimate. While Keddie and Lambton also saw this 
ideology of hostility to worldly power as a key component of ʿulama action, they also 
emphasized the damage done to the ʿulama patron’s by increasing penetration. 
However, Keddie, Lambton, and Algar all saw material or class interest alone as 
insufficient to explain ʿulama behavior. All three agreed that the doctrine of the 
Imamate was crucial to the Constitutional Revolution. Keddie, Lambton, and Algar also 
emphasized a lived Shiʿism connected to the life of Iranians through rituals. In 
particular, they emphasized guild and bazaar rituals surrounding Muharram. However, 
these authors also saw Shi’i Islam as largely unchanging and constant and used 
contemporary understanding of Shi’ism as proof that the ‘ulama were inherently 
revolutionary. 
 These authors saw the ʿulama as an institution inherently hostile to and 
independent of the Qajar state. Keddie, Lambton, and Algar traced this, in part, to the 
Shiʿi conception of the Imamate and the pre-eminence of religion in political thought. 
For them, Shiʿi Islam always doctrinally contained an element of “potential opposition 
from the Shi’a ʿulama to the shah” based on the principles of “legitimate succession 
having been passed down through the house of Ali until the last, or hidden Imam, who 
will reappear to establish legitimate rule.”10 Lambton also emphasized the position of 
the ʿulama as “representative of the hidden imam” who guided and legitimized “the 
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philosopher king, the shadow of God upon earth.”11 In the case of Algar, he emphasized 
and essential and timeless “essence” to Shiʿi religion, transmitted to its followers 
through participation in rituals. Resistance to tyranny was “the fundamental and most 
pervasive charecteristcs of Ithnā‘ashari Shiʿa Islam, and this stance was not inspired 
exclusively by the defects of Qajar rule…Hence, all states are inalienably usurpory, 
even those of formal Shiʿa affiliation.”12 This hostility and independence was related 
not only to ideology, but also to the economic interests of the ʿulama through their close 
connection to the traditional bazaar.  
All three authors emphasized the ʿulama as universally respected in Iranian 
society, especially by bazaar merchants, who supported them financially. Lambton 
wrote, “the ʿulama...were in constant touch with the people….it was to them therefore, 
and not to the government officials, that the people naturally looked for the fulfillment 
of their aspirations and, above all, for protection.”13 The ʿulama were “drawn into 
politics as the protectors of the poor and weak, on the one hand, and the legitimator of 
the ruling powers on the other.”14 Even though the Shiʿi hierocracy did not frequently 
intervene in politics, “the pious withdrawal from politics at the highest level of the 
hierocracy tremendously enhanced the effectiveness of their rare interventions in 
political crises.”15 The ʿulama were “the only ones who could voice popular grievances 
with relative impunity” and “were often appealed to voice the grievances” of the 
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people.16 The group that most frequently depended on the services of the ʿulama was 
the traditional bazaar. This shared view of the ʿulama’s role in Iranian society led to a 
similar view of social change.  
The authors therefore argued that the revolution was a product of both Shi’i 
ideology and Qajar decline, mixing both socio-economic and behavioral explanations of 
social action. Unlike Browne, these authors believed that, except for a narrow class of 
intellectuals, Iranian society was not destined to emulate Western democracy.  Shi’ism 
provided a language of protest and the ‘ulama provided the leadership. Lambton wrote 
that while the coalitions of the Tobacco protests and the Constitutional Revolution 
included many sectors of society, “since the aim of such action was the restoration of 
just or righteous, i.e. shar’i, government, the natural leaders of the movement were the 
ʿulama.’”17 Keddie puts this even more starkly and wrote even “radicals and 
modernizers” like Malkam Khan, Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, and Mirza Aga Khan 
Kermani “saw the religious nature of much of the mass reactions against foreign 
concessions” and that it was “religious feeling against infidels which could most 
effectively mobilize mass action against foreigners.”18 This left the European inspired 
modernizers and radicals with little choice but to seek an alliance with the ʿulama. 
Contrary to Browne’s view, the European inspired “radicals” and modernizers were not 
representative of Iranian society. Attempts by modernizers to justify reforms with 
“religious terminology...were tactical rather than sincere” and “the insistence that 
modern law [could] be found in Islam [was] a self-protective device rather than a 
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religious conviction.”19 Lambton similarly wrote that even if some members of Iranian 
society “looked to the liberal west for the political ideas...such an ideology could only 
have been acceptable if interpreted in terms of Islam.”20 This common view of Iranian 
society, which in turn led to similar views of social change, was the product of a 
particular time. 
 Algar, Lambton, and Keddie used accounts of rituals and sermons from 
travelogues and memoirs to define Shiʿi Islam and the beliefs of the ʿulama. In 
particular, Jean Chardin’s Voyages de monsieur le chavalier Chardin en Perse et autres 
lieus de l’Orient figures prominently in the bibliographies of Lambton and Keddie, even 
though Chardin wrote during the 17th century, during the Safavid dynasty. In Religion 
and State in Iran, Algar used a wider collection of ʿulama biographies as well as Persian 
language histories of the Constitutional Revolution.21 While a consistent, anti-Qajar 
Shi’i tradition passed down to the people of Iran through popular rituals was a 
convenient an compelling explanation, especially in light of events in Iran, it was soon 
challenged not only by events in Iran, but also by detailed study of the writings of the 
‘ulama as well as investigation into the social bases of political power in Iran. These 
projects would be accomplished both through historical sociology and social history. 
 
The ʿUlama as Allies of the State 
 Said Amir Arjomand’s The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam represented a 
major break, both in methodology and the conclusions he drew, from Keddie and Algar. 
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His work offered “a new perspective for the analysis of the role of religion in political 
action in pre-modern societies; and second, to offer a comprehensive examination of the 
establishment of Shi'ite Islam as the state religion of Iran.”22 Instead of turning to the 
public manifestation of religious life to understand the meaning of Shiʿism, he instead 
studied the writings of influential ʿulama. In contrast to Keddie and Algar, he concluded 
that the ʿulama largely accommodated and validated the temporal rule of the Qajars. 
Much like Keddie and Algar, he concluded that the Qajar failures to protect Iran from 
Western intrusions pushed the ʿulama into backing the Constitutional Revolution. 
Scholars did not universally accept Arjomand’s account of the Shiʿi ʿulama. In 
particular, Nikki Keddie mounted a sustained criticism of Arjomand’s work, 
particularly criticizing him for characterizing certain scholars as representative of the 
ʿulama as a whole and his reliance on the writings as opposed to accounts of religious 
life. But Arjomand’s challenge to the Keddie-Algar-Lambton view of Shiʿism and the 
ʿulama was very significant in that it opened to the way for more research into the 
ʿulama, ultimately revealing deep divisions between the ʿulama and Iranian society. 
 Unlike Keddie and Algar, Arjomand cast the ʿulama’s role in Iranian society as 
changing. Arjomand saw Shiʿism as a “source of motivation to social action” in that 
Shiʿism shaped “the believers’ attitudes, and in that they differentially affect the 
believers’ propensities to action in various spheres of life.”23 In this way, “religious 
norms” eventually manifested themselves in the principles of social and political 
organization.24 Arjomand’s goal was to investigate “how, amid their interplay with 
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men’s pursuits of material interests and their struggle for power, the normative ideals of 
Shiʿism as embodied in its life-regulating belief system came to act as switchmen and to 
determine the tracks into which the political action was directed.”25 Whereas Keddie 
and Algar saw a consistent Shiʿi opposition to temporal power, Arjomand pointed to 
changing attitudes to temporal authority. Rather than harboring a consistent claim to 
rule in the absence of the 12th Imam, Arjomand pointed to accommodation and 
endorsement of Safavid and Qajar rule. In particular, he highlighted the anti-
Constitutional cleric Shaykh Fayzullah Nuri as representative of the orthodox ʿulama. 
Unlike Keddie and Algar, Arjomand’s Iran was submissive to the Qajar shahs.   
 Like Keddie and Algar, Arjomand emphasized the role of Shiʿi thought in 
political and social life. Arjomand wrote that there did not exist “a secular conception of 
society” in Iran and “the autonomy of the hierocracy facilitated its isolation from the 
state and made it completely immune from secular influences.”26 In the Qajar period, 
the hierocracy  “was the depository of the authority of the Hidden Imam in the religious 
sphere” while the Qajar Shahs held political authority so long as he ruled within the 
norms of just kingly behavior established by the hierocracy.27 Like Keddie and Algar, 
the failure of the Qajar shahs “to discharge his responsibility of protecting the nation’s 
interests” was the emergency necessary for “the highest-ranking member of members of 
the hierocracy residing in the holy cities of Iraq” to assume a political role.28 Arjomand 
disagreed about the nature of Shiʿi Islam, but not its overall importance inside of Iranian 
society.  
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 Arjomand’s line of inquiry into the political writings and thoughts of the ʿulama 
was also accompanied by an interest in anti-Constitutional clerics, especially Shaykh 
Fazullah Nuri.  The challenge became more severe in his edited volume, Authority and 
Political Culture in Shiʿism, where Abdol Karim Lahidji’s article “Constitutionalism 
and Clerical Authority” and Arjomand’s “Ideological Revolution in Shiʿism” directly 
challenged the contention that the ʿulama were the leaders of the Constitutional 
Movement and emphasized the role of reactionary clerics like Shaykh Fazullah Nuri in 
mobilizing opposition to the Constitution. Arjomand put these sentiments in Wagnerian 
terms and stated that the ʿulama during the Qajar period became a “hierocracy” with 
“political power as the independent custodians of religion and of sacral law.”29 This 
characterization of the ʿulama did not go unchallenged by Keddie and Algar. 
 Keddie and Algar criticized Arjomand for his emphasis on certain ʿulama as 
representative and his emphasis on ideology and theology, as opposed to spiritual life. 
Keddie defended her and Algar’s view of the ʿulama by “this may only show the 
discrepancy between what was spoken and what was published-a discrepancy often 
found under oppressive governments.” So, given that Chardin mentioned comments by 
the ʿulama and that these sentiments were “reiterated in later centuries by men who 
never read Chardin” then these statements “should be given considerable weight.”30  
Keddie wrote that:  
Whether or not the idea that the mujtahids partake in the charisma of the 
Imams  had prior justification, and whether or not the idea that temporal 
governments lack legitimacy had a long history, many of the ulama and their lay 
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followers came to believe such things in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
when temporal rulers were increasingly compared to the Umayyad killers of the 
martyred Imam Hosain.31  
  
 Here, Keddie linked her interpretation of the past explicitly to present events. 
The present filled in the gaps in our understanding of the Qajar past, but that was 
perhaps inevitable and useful. Keddie’s argument was compelling in that there clearly 
was some continuity between the past and the present, and this continuity could be used 
to understand political culture during the Constitutional Revolution in Iran. Further, 
scholars pointed out that Arjomand's portrayal of a submissive Iranian populace was not 
supported by the religiously inspired Babi rebellion of 1848-1850. However, Arjomand 
left an indisputable mark on literature. In particular, his painstaking documentation of 
ʿulama writings demonstrated that, at least among some of the ʿulama, attitudes towards 
temporal authority had changed. A broad failing of both Keddie and Arjomand was 
their failure to account for the behavior and participation of religious minorities, 
specifically Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and non-orthodox Shi’a.    
  
Afary, Bayat, and Abrahamian: The View After the Revolution 
 Janet Afary, Mangol Bayat, and Ervand Abrahamian saw the Shiʿi ʿulama as a 
reactionary political group acting out of class interest and ideological opposition to 
democracy. Rather than seeing Iranian society and political culture as synonymous with 
Shiʿi Islam, these authors saw Iranian society as incredibly diverse and reflective of 
varying ethnic and religious communities. Further, these authors were much more 
willing to highlight ideological and class differences among the ʿulama. These authors 
largely saw the Constitutional Revolution as a product of leftist and heterodox Shiʿi 
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agitation. This was largely a product of the changes in both academia and in Iran. The 
post-revolutionary violence highlighted persistent ethnic, class, and religious tensions 
inside of Iranian society. The rise of social history in academia made these conflicts of 
particular interest to scholars. These scholars, unlike Keddie and Algar, had seen the 
conclusion of the Islamic Revolution. The brutal suppression of liberal and leftist 
political activity during the 1980’s and the consolidation of power in the hands of the 
ʿulama undermined characterizations of them as benevolent protectors of the people 
from tyranny. Abrahamian, Bayat, and Afary were positioned perfectly to focus on 
interpretations of the Constitutional Revolution as a secular event. They were writing in 
a unique moment of time when the ʿulama and Shiʿi Islam appeared hostile to both 
democracy and scholars also possessed the framework and sources to foreground liberal 
and leftist political activity. 
 By the 1980’s, there had been a sustained attempt to study the social history of 
Qajar Iran. Reminiscent of European historiography, this process began with economic 
histories of Qajar Iran like Charles Issawi’s The Economic History of Iran 1800-1914. 
This volume addressed key questions about the status of foreign trade in Iran and social 
class structure. The 1983 issue of Iranian studies was devoted to social history of the 
Qajar era, as was Modern Iran: Dialectics of Continuity and Change edited by Nikkie 
Keddie and Michael Bonine. Scholars became increasingly aware of regional variation 
and change in Iranian society. Shiʿism was increasingly seen as an important part of 
Iranian society, but not the only part. Authors increasingly acknowledged tribal, Jewish, 
Armenian participation in Iranian society. These studies of the economic and social 
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conditions of Qajar Iran were followed by Ervand Abrahamian’s classic of Iranian 
social history, Iran: Between Two Revolutions.    
 Abrahamian’s project was explicitly inspired by E.P. Thomson’s The Making of 
the English Working Class, and therefore looked to the social bases of contemporary 
Iranian politics. His analysis focused on “the interaction between political organizations 
and social forces” which were categorized as either “ethnic groups” or “social forces.”32 
The ‘ulama were separated into both the upper and middle class, with their own sources 
of income, amounts of revenue, and influence. Consequently, upper class ‘ulama who 
received official state positions and land grants sided with the Qajar state, while lower 
ranking ‘ulama and religious students sided with the middle class merchants who were 
their patrons.33  
 Abrahamian saw Iranian society on the verge of the Constitutional Revolution as 
deeply divided along communal, ethnic, and religious lines. For Abrahamian, “[t]he 
predominance of communal ties retarded the formation of manifest, subjective, and 
sociopolitical classes.”34 Rather, Iran was divided among a Shi’i majority, a Sunni 
minority, as well as non-Muslims. These groups were further divided into different 
sects, ethnicities, and tribes, which lived in their own wards or regions.35 Ultimately, 
Abrahamian explained with Constitutional Revolution with a marxian framework, 
which emphasized the role of communal ties among the Bazaar merchants, guilds, and 
the ‘ulama as the cause of the revolution. However, his detailed description of the 
differences in Iranian society led to questions about how what, besides, material class 
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interest, inspired these minorities to action. Further, as the 1979 Revolution became the 
Islamic Revolution, scholars turned their attention to re-formulating their understanding 
of Shiʿi Islam. 
 Mangol Bayat’s Iran’s First Revolution was a near complete challenge to the 
Algar and Keddie depiction of Shiʿi Islam. One, she challenged the notion that the 
ʿulama were universally well regarded in Iranian society. Two, she firmly cast the 
Twelver ʿulama in the royalist camp. As the name of Bayat’s book, her work was 
connected to the 1979 revolution. Unlike Abrahamian, Bayat was concerned with the 
role of religion in Iranian society, and was largely inspired by Bell’s theories. In pursuit 
of this, Bayat systematically challenged many of the assumptions of the ʿulama’s role in 
Iranian society. For Bayat, the orthodox ʿulama were largely in the camp of the Shah. 
Like Keddie, Bayat was concerned with the social role of the ʿulama. Unlike Keddie, 
Bayat saw the ʿulama as define by “their corruptibility, their susceptibility to court and 
foreign intrigues as well as to manipulation by individuals and groups...they were 
indistinguishable from the ruling class, which increasingly alienated the discontented 
masses.”36 Rather than being a self-contained and independent class acting to protect 
the tradition bazaar, the ʿulama acted out of “centuries-old politics of intrigue that 
characterizes an elite faction temporarily out of favor”37 and individual members sought 
external financial resources in pursuance of competition with one another.38 In this 
same vein, ʿulama cooperation with modernizers was born out of political competition 
with modernizers who were becoming popular in their own right. Bayat concluded that 
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“mainstream Shiʿism and the top hierarchy of the religious institutions...were in fact the 
least important agents of constitutional change in society” and the most active and 
powerful supporters of the Constitution were inspired by “Shiʿi radicalism, Western 
liberalism, and Russian Social Democracy.”39 Contrary to the depiction of ʿulama’s 
economic decline put forward by Keddie and Lambton, Afary noted that cash taxes and 
pressure from landlords created a situation where “peasants, wishing to safeguard their 
existence, have been compelled to make a present of their land allotments to mosques” 
and as a result “the ʿulama had regained extensive waqf lands and continued to gather 
handsome revenues from the villages.”40 Not only did some ʿulama benefit from the 
status quo and penetration of global economic forces, but they also were part of the 
same patrimonial patronage networks as other notables.  
 Bayat and Afary saw non-clerical political activists and heterodox Shiʿi clergy 
as much more important to the success of mass protests than the orthodox ʿulama . The 
ʿulama joined the modernists and radicals out of a desire to not be left behind. “Some 
orthodox clerics in this coalition were resentful of the popularity of modernist ideas 
among the intellectuals and envisioned a ‘constitutional order’ in which the rulings of 
the ʿulama would be codified and elevated above those of either the absolutists or 
modernist elements.”41 These Shiʿi radicals were distinct from “progressive ʿulama, in 
that they sought revolutionary change and not just reform. This focus on “heterodox” 
Shi’a included a total reversal in the role of the Bahai in the Constitutional Revolution. 
 Afary and Bayat emphasized the role of several prominent Bahai as an important 
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part of the Constitutional Revolution. Keddie and Lambton had acknowledge the 
existence of some Bahai among the supporters of the Constitution, but ultimately saw 
their contribution as marginal. Afary and Keddie used new sources, especially 
Malekzadeh’s Tarikh-e Inqlab, to “out” a number of influential political activists. Afary 
and Bayat note that most Baha’is “remained neutral during the Constitutional 
Revolution itself,” but “the earlier writings of the leaders of the movement were known 
and discussed by both Baha’i and non-Baha’i intellectuals, including some of the 
‘ulama.”42    
 Like Abrahamian, and Keddie, these authors saw the ʿulama as a class largely 
working to protect its interests. The true danger to ʿulama interests comes not from 
foreign intrusion or Qajar despotism, but from the secular modernizers whose ideas of 
positivism and social democracy directly challenge the survival of ʿulama privilege. The 
Constitution thus “marked the triumph of secularist trends” and not just, Sharia inspired 
governance. The Constitution “ushered in institutional changes and underscored the 
shrinking of olama [sic] authority in society.”43 Thus, the main antagonists of the 
ʿulama were not the state but secular reformers. This interpretation of Iranian history is 
also an echo of the post-1979 political battle inside of Iran. Bayat and Afary focus on 
the opposition of Nuri and other conservative clerics to the Supplementary Laws as 
proof of this. This confrontation “became a vehicle through which the Shi’ite ʿulama 
safeguarded their institutional and ideological domination within the new political 
order.”44 The ʿulama, typified by Nuri, were described as hostile to secularization. 
 These scholars suffered from some of the same mistakes that characterized 
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Algar and Keddie. One review took Bayat’s revisionism to task by writing, “[w]hile 
successful in dispelling old myths about the Constitutional Revolution, Bayat may have 
helped create new ones.”45 While Abrahamian, Bayat, and Afary extensively used 
newspapers and publications from the period to justify their claims about Iranian society 
and political activity, they, like Keddie and Algar, were too eager to see their evidence 
as representative of Iran as a whole. They treated a group, which claimed to be 
representative of the masses, as such, without investigating their actual influence. 
Abrahamian, Bayat, and Afary very clearly situated the core of the revolution in the 
north of the country. However, this begs the question about how the rest of the country 
was involved in the revolution.  
 
Martin and Farzaneh: New Sources   
 Vanessa Martin and Mateo Farzaneh represent the enduring challenge of 
studying the ʿulama. The Islamic Revolution eventually moderated. Reformists and 
moderates, including clerics like Ayatollah Rafsanjani and Hojat al-Islam Khatami, 
pushed for democratic reforms and individual rights, often using Islamic arguments. 
Thus, scholars began to reconsider Bayat and Afary’s criticisms of the ʿulama. Further, 
scholars were interested in highlighting regional or non-Tabriz and non-Tehran 
perspectives of the Revolution. Two authors in particular addressed these gaps in the 
literature. Farzaneh’s The Iranian Constitutional Revolution and the Clerical 
Leadership of Khorasani was a study of the writings and political activity es of 
Ayatollah Khorasani, a high-ranking pro-constitutional cleric, who wrote from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Reza Afshari, “Review of Iran’s First Revolution,” review of Iran’s First Revolution, by Mangol 
Bayat, Iranian Studies 26, No.1-2 (Winter-Spring, 1993): 169-173. 
	  
 56	  
relative security of the holy city of Najaf, Iraq. Khorasani was often referenced but his 
opinions and writings were largely unstudied. Like Farzaneh, Vanessa Martin’s Iran 
between Islamic Nationalism and Secularism: The Constitutional Revolution of 1906 
sought to reconcile the role of the ʿulama in the Constitutional Revolution. Martin 
organized her work in part geographically, moving her gaze beyond Tehran and Tabriz. 
Further, she looked at how reactionary or religious political organizations beyond the 
ʿulama and their associated institutions. Martin and Farzaneh both made important 
contributions in understanding the relationship between society and religion.  
  Both authors return to a view of the importance of the ʿulama and Islam to 
protest against the state, but allowed for regional and personal variation. Theirs was a 
more cautious endorsement of the “Qajar pact” (Martin’s term) or the dual system of 
ʿulama-Qajar power where either side was required to endorse the legitimacy of and 
support the other. The Tobacco protests demonstrated that the ʿulama were “a force 
with the ability to rally the people while influencing an arbitrary and despotic 
government such as that of Nasir al-Din Shah.”46 Martin emphasized the cultural 
importance of Islam in the politics of protest. Martin wrote, “Iran was a profoundly 
Islamic society” where Islam “permeated social and family relations; the regulations of 
communities...and the varying theories of the legitimacy of government.” Further, 
“popular grievances were often expressed through a religious channel, namely the 
ʿulama, who were looked upon as mediators between the people and the government.”47 
This return to the importance of the ʿulama and Islam was continued in the author's’ 
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characterization of the relationship between European inspired modernizers and the 
ʿulama.  
 This view of the ʿulama again emphasized them as the most important part of 
Constitutional Revolution. Farzaneh returns to the example of Malkom Khan 
appropriating the language of Islam to justify his modernizing reforms. “The idea of 
using Islam to entice people to participate in popular protests was so strong that even 
non-religious modernists used it to advance their objectives.”48 Martin emphasized that 
these modernists were “very few” and limited to “the bureaucracy, as yet small circles 
of the intelligentsia, and a few of the ʿulama.” These few modernizers “were careful not 
to make the full implications” of the reforms they advocated clear “both for fear of 
offending the ʿulama, and also to enable their involvement in the movement.”49 The 
only place where debates over secularism and religion were truly central to 
Constitutionalism was in Tabriz and “elsewhere, secularism hardly appeared.”50 Thus, 
the anti-ʿulama implications of secularism were not widely known, nor was there a 
popular movement against the ʿulama. This important nuance from previous narratives 
affected Martin and Farzaneh’s characterization of secularism’s relationship to the 
ʿulama. 
 This new wave of scholarship did not mention the Bahai or heterodox Shi’a. 
These authors highlighted Islamic arguments supporting secularizing reforms that have 
previously been seen as antithetical to ʿulama interests. Secularism, or the retreat of 
religion from government and politics, was defended as necessary to protect the 
independence of Muslim nations and preserve the position of the ʿulama in society. 
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Martin moves away from Nuri as representative of the ʿulama and emphasized that “the 
ʿulama of the provinces, or at least those who held political views, were strongly in 
favor of the Majlis, which they saw as an Islamic institution which would strengthen the 
country against foreign incursions, and secure the foundations of Islam” by protecting 
against arbitrary absolutist rule. In this same way, many 'ʿulama saw reforms in 
jurisprudence, taxation, and education as necessary to protect Iran from foreign 
invasion.51 In the specific case of Khorasani, Farzaneh pointed out that Khurasani’s 
endorsement of Majlis and its reform program demonstrated that Shi’ite thought and 
traditions allowed for “a great deal of room for interpreting concepts and ideas that 
might otherwise be used to keep Muslims from improving their lives.”52 These 
arguments provide compelling evidence that the relationship between secularization and 
religion is not a simple. The particular context of defensive development in Iran and 
aspects of Shiʿi doctrine created a situation where ʿulama defended and advocated 
reforms that required them to retreat from aspects of public life.  
 
Conclusion: 
 Religion and the ʿulama play a number of roles in the historiography of the 
Constitutional Revolution. One, the writing of the ʿulama provided a way to study an 
ideology and a theology. Two, religion can be treated as a sociological phenomenon 
with an accompanying class. Three, they serve as a proxy to study the political and 
social attitudes of the “masses” as part of social history. In order to explain the role of 
the religion and the ʿulama in the Constitutional Revolution, no approach is sufficient in 
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itself. For example, Arjomand carefully examined the ideology of Shi’a Islam, but also 
integrated it into a Weberian framework of social change. As was discussed in the 
introduction, a history of the Constitutional Revolution must engage in both social 
history and historical sociology. 
 The study of Shi’a Islam as ideology and theology is the least problematic. 
When religion is reduced to a series of key texts, then histories are presented with a 
definite set of research materials that can be evaluated using exegesis. Keddie and 
Arjomand agreed about what was written by certain authors. What was the cause of 
bitter disagreement was what writing were actually representative of the beliefs of the 
majority of the ‘ulama. To this end, Arjomand and Keddie argued intensely over 
whether Saykh Fayzullah Nuri was a mainstream or marginal figure. Afary and Bayat 
took this argument one step further and questioned to what extent Shi’a Islam or the 
ʿulama were even respected or influential in Iranian society. What scholars disagree on 
is not theology. Scholars do not truly care about the theology of Shi’a Islam. They care 
about theology and ideology as a window into the mentality of Iranian society. It is a 
proxy for actually knowing the beliefs and thoughts of the people. In this way, ideology 
and theology are, for historians of the Constitutional Revolution, useful as part of social 
history. 
 Religion can also be viewed as a lived phenomenon experienced through group 
experiences and rituals. Instead of focusing on the writings of the ʿulama as a way to 
understand the beliefs of a society, scholars can also look to the rituals and symbols of 
Shi’a Islam as a way to understand the values and beliefs of Iranians. Knowledge of this 
lived experience is often difficult to obtain. The case of the Bahai and heterodox Shia 
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underlines this. The true feelings of some, if not many, may not be represented in texts 
or writing for fear of persecution. Bayat and Afary raised serious questions about the 
extent to which the formal pronouncements of religious leaders can be used to explain 
the mentality or beliefs of a religious community.  
 The historiography of the role of religion and the ʿulama demonstrates the 
connected relationship between social history and historical sociology. The insight of 
social history is needed to explain how the processes and concepts highlighted by 
historical sociology are perceived and play out in the case of the Constitutional 
Revolution. Religion is an important part of this, as it provides an insight into the 
beliefs and experiences of individuals. The writing and actions of the ʿulama play an 
important role in enriching our understanding of Iranian society. The writing of the 
ʿulama provide crucial written documents for historians. However, Shi’a Islam was not 
the only basis for the organization of Iranian society. Iran was and is composed of 
several different ethnic groups. 
 A major problem of relying on Shi’ism, especially as interpreted by the ʿulama, 
as synonymous with the beliefs of Iranians is that many Iranians had alternative or 
competing sources of identity. As chapter three will discuss, religious and ethnic 
minorities were both important actors in the Constitutional Revolution and were not led 
by the ʿulama. Iranian Armenians practiced Armenian orthodox Christianity, while the 
Bakhtiyari tribe practiced sufi Islam. Further, religion alone may not have defined the 
mentality or mind of an Iranian on the eve of the Constitutional Revolution. Theories of 
social change cannot help us abstract without some understanding of how Iranian 
	  
 61	  
society’s organization and mentality. Religion provides part of this answer, but ethnicity 




At the Limits of Iranian History:1 Social History and Ethnicity in the 
Constitutional Revolution 
 
 The literature of the Constitutional Revolution has increasingly recognized the 
role of minorities, but the perspective of minorities remains incompletely integrated into 
the history of the Constitutional Revolution. The participation of members of minority 
groups has always been acknowledged, but they were infrequently named as members 
of minority groups. Even when they were, the discussion was limited to the contribution 
of elite individuals, like Malkom Khan, Sardar Asʿad, or Yephraim Khan. As social-
cultural historians paid more attention to minority groups, discussions of the 
Constitutional Revolution focused more on the participation of Azeris, Armenians, and 
the Bakhtiyari tribe as key supporters of the Constitutional Revolution. However, the 
specificity of the narratives often ran the risk of sectioning off minority perspectives 
into their own, self-contained monographs. While this approach has helped bring 
forward neglected aspects of the history of the Constitutional Revolution, historians 
should seek to examine a unique minority or non-dominant perspective to the 
Constitutional Revolution. Doing so will provide important insights on the limits of 
Iranian nationalism at a critical moment of political contestation.    
 Increased attention to the role of minorities in the Constitutional Revolution 
mirrored the historiographical progression of social history. Social history was initially 
concerned with the history of the “lower or poorer classes” and the “manners and 
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customs” of life.2 However, this focus on “history from below” gradually led to interest 
in the perspective of other marginalized groups that were included in the lower classes, 
but were not totally defined by their class membership. But there was a tension between 
emphasizing the particularity or specialness of a particular group and also integrating 
that group into larger patterns of human behaviors. As Fustel de Coulagnes wrote, 
“History is not the accumulation of events of all kinds which occurred in the past. It is 
the science of human societies.”3 Much like in the case of the ʿulama, there was a 
tension regarding how to explain social and political change and its relationship to 
culture. In this way, even though these three ethnic minorities are unique, they occupied 
similar positions in Iranian society during the Constitutional Revolution and have 
similar historiographies. These minority groups, despite their differences, present a 
number of challenges to the historiography of the Constitutional Revolution. All three 
of these groups were considered key participants and supporters of the Constitutional 
cause. All three groups were and are still considered different from Persians, especially 
at the time of the Constitutional Revolution. Further, linguistic issues make archival 
research into these groups difficult and are also obstacles for scholars of Iran who try to 
integrate them in the history of the Constitutional Revolution. These common themes 
suggest a common minority perspective on the Constitutional Revolution. 
 Interest in minorities was a logical consequence of research into economic and 
social conditions in Iran. The work of Abrahamian in Iran: Between Two Revolutions, 
the first attempt at an Iranian version of the E.P. Thompson’s The Making of the English 
Working Class, demonstrates how difficult it was to separate ethnicity from social 
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history. In the course of his examination of the “social bases of Iranian politics,” 
Abrahamian pointed to the “predominance of communal ties” which “retarded the 
formation of manifest, subjective, and sociopolitical classes” during the late Qajar and 
Constitutional periods. Following on his research, these communal ties then became the 
subject of social histories. This research was encouraged by the rise in ethnic conflict 
(especially Kurds and Arabs) during the 1979 Revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, and the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenian and Azerbaijan. This return of 
nationalisms (plural) undermined modernization theory predictions that eventually these 
communal identities would be homogenized. Scholars, however, had lost access to 
archives inside of Iran. However, while Abrahamian had woven his description of 
identity into a larger narrative about social change in Iran, research after him would 
look at groups vertically and in isolation from one another.  
 
The Azeris: The Salt of the Assembly  
 The history of Azeri participation in the Constitutional Revolution lacks a 
framework for understanding “Azeri” identity in Iran. Browne, Abrahamian, Keddie, 
Bayat, Afary, and Martin consistently singled out Azerbaijan as the home of the most 
“radical” activists and the most determined supporters of the Constitution. Authors 
attributed this to Azerbaijan’s “proximity” to the Russian Revolution of 1905 in the 
form of trade and ethnic ties to the Caucasus. In particular, the literature singled out the 
large population of Iranians who migrated for work in Baku. However, the literature 
treated Azeri identity inconsistently. In the Caucasus, Azeris were a distinct ethnic 
group who occupied a marginalized position in Russian society and were consequently 
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sympathetic to social democracy movements. But the literature did not give Azeris in 
Iran the same treatment. This may have been due to differences between conditions in 
the Russian Caucasus and Azerbaijan. However, this was more assumed than discussed. 
For Browne, Keddie, Bayat, and Afary, Azerbaijan was defined not as the home of a 
Turkic people, but as the home of support for the Constitution. Thus, while the 
contributions of the province of Azerbaijan and the city of Tabriz were acknowledged, 
their relationship to ethnic politics and conflicts in the Caucasus was poorly defined. 
This problem, while present in all of the literature, was most manifest in Browne.  
 Browne highlighted the role of Azerbaijan and Tabriz in the Constitutional 
Revolution, but was cautious to emphasize that these places were a part of a 
homogenous Iranian nation. Browne considered the “deputies from Azarbayjan[sic]” as 
the most ardent defenders of constitutionalism, calling them the “salt of the Assembly.”4 
The deputies of Azerbaijan were the core of the Assembly (Majlis) and the “Popular 
party”, which was the party Browne considered the most pure expression of the Iranian 
“nation.” Browne singled out the deputies of Tabriz “as being sincere patriots almost to 
a man” and “represented the more extreme or radical party, and seem to have been 
influenced by the ideas of the Russian reformers.”5 Though Browne saw the influence 
of European ideology as desirable, Browne was careful not to emphasize this 
connection. Similarly, even though Browne acknowledged the connection of political 
developments in Azerbaijan to political developments in the Caucasus, he was cautious 
in how he characterized these connections. 
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 Browne likely deliberately played down ethnic differences to make the Iranian 
revolution more palatable to British political elites. As the debate between Foreign 
Minister Grey over the British support for the Qajar government and its alliance with 
Russia raged, Taqizadeh and Browne “consciously sought to project a moderate and 
accommodating image of themselves and to disclaim charges of extremism. Their 
British detractors, on the other hand, were equally determined to counter such 
disclaimers.”6 However, in his travelogue of Iran written in 1893, Browne wrote that he 
considered Iranian history as marked by antagonism between northern Turks and 
southern Persians. In A Year Amongst the Persians, he wrote, “The old antipathy is well 
marked even today, as anyone who has taken the trouble to find out knows what the 
southern peasant thinks of the northerners, and how northerners regard the cradle of 
Persia’s ancient greatness.”7 As pointed out before, Browne’s history was deeply 
influenced by a desire to make an Iranian nation worthy of sympathy and aid. He 
therefore needs to show that Russian and British imperial control was not necessary 
stabilize Iran, but that Iranian nationalists already had a “modernizing orientation” and 
that “constitutionalism and nationalism were not alien imports forced upon the Iranian 
society by a small group of Europeanized intellectuals.”8 Browne and Taqizadeh then 
had to show that these characteristics, present in Tabriz, were representative of Iran in 
general. Taqizadeh would also influence the work of Nikki Keddie.  
 Nikki Keddie’s most enduring contribution to the study of the Azeri and 
Armenian contributions to the Constitutional Revolution came in the form of a 
translation of a speech by Hassan Taqizadeh published in the Middle East Journal as 
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“The Background of the Constitutional Movement in Azerbaijan.”9 Hassan Taqizadeh 
was a prominent intellectual and political player in the Constitutional Revolution. He 
was generally associated with the Constitutionalists and would spent significant time in 
England as a guest of Browne and as Iranian ambassador. This particular speech was 
delivered in April 1959 in Tabriz at the University of Tabriz. Taqizadeh described 
“Azerbaijan and especially Tabriz [as] the centers of modern thought” in Iran and 
therefore played a prominent role in the “reform movement” and the Constitutional 
Revolution.10 Taqizadeh referred to Iranian and Russian Azerbaijan, but the term 
“Caucasian Moslems” was used to refer to people who otherwise might have been 
labeled Azeri. Taqizadeh emphasized the Caucasus as the entry point for printing 
technology into Iran and that “reading and writing of the Persian language was just as 
common in Transcaucasia as in Tabriz.” 11 He also cited the “rapid development of 
thought and political activity among the Moslems of the Caucasus” due to the military 
defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese war, the granting of a Duma in Russia by the 
1905 Constitution, and “fighting between Armenian and Moslems.”12 Keddie explicitly 
cited this article as the source for scholars looking to learn about the Caucasian 
contributions to the Constitutional Revolution.13 Taqizadeh’s thoughts had a 
tremendous impact on Keddie, just as they had on Browne.   
 Keddie also gave special attention to Azerbaijan, because it hosted the city of 
Tabriz and particular “great” men. This understanding of Azerbaijan was largely 
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borrowed from the thought of Hassan Taqizadeh. Like Browne, who also personally 
knew Taqizadeh, Keddie emphasized the role of Tabriz in the revolution. However, 
Keddie characterized Tabriz’s participation in the context of “mass popular 
participation.” She cited Abrahamian and characterized popular participation in the 
Constitutional Revolution as essentially limited to the urban classes.14 Tabriz was 
important because it was an urban center, not because it had a unique cultural heritage 
and identity. As Tabriz was the largest and most industrialized urban center in Iran at 
the time, it naturally became the focus of attention for Abrahamian and Keddie. For 
Keddie, the resistance of the Tabriz against royalist forces during the civil war was also 
due to “a courageous man of the common people, Sattar Khan, [who] refused to 
surrender.”15 In this way, the important divisions in Iran were based not on language or 
ethnicity, but class and geography.  
 Abrahamian drew attention to leftist political activity in Russian and Iranian 
Azerbaijan as one of the causes of the Constitutional Revolution. Abrahamian 
highlighted the role of secret or clandestine political societies in the revolution. He 
highlighted “the Secret Center, the Social Democracy party, the Society of Humanity, 
the Revolutionary Committee, and the Secret Society” in particular as the key 
contributors to the Constitutional Revolution.16  Of the five, the Secret Center and the 
Social Democratic party had strong links to Azerbaijan and the Caucasus. The Secret 
Center was founded in Tabriz and the Social Democratic Party of Iran was founded in 
Baku and had a strong relationship with the Social Democratic Party of Russia. The 
party’s leader, Narim Narimanov, “later became the president of the Soviet Socialist 
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Republic of Azerbaijan.”17 Unlike the Society of Humanity, the Revolutionary 
Committee, and the Secret Society, both these organizations were influenced by the 
revolutionary socialism of Russian Marxism.18 For Abrahamian, these parties showed 
their true importance during the Civil War of 1908-1909, when Tabriz became the lone 
holdout against newly emboldened Royalist forces. 
 Abrahamian emphasized Tabriz and Caucasian revolutionaries as the most 
dedicated supporters of Constitutionalism during the Civil War of 1908-1909. For 
Abrahamian, “the drama of the civil war took place mostly in Tabriz.”19 He emphasized 
the Secret Center and the Social Democrats in organizing the resistance and securing 
support from Caucasian revolutionaries.20 Caucasian revolutionaries provided advanced 
military equipment (explosives, rifles, and ammunition) as well as highly motivated 
fighters. But this enthusiasm for the Constitutional causes begged an important 
question, why were these revolutionaries willing to fight and die in Iran? Why did they 
not focus their struggle on the Ottoman Empire or the Russian Caucasus?  
 Up to this point, the literature’s treatment of the relationship of Azerbaijan and 
Azeris to the rest of Iran and to other Caucasian groups was ambiguous. While Tabriz 
was first in Abrahamian’s mind, he also mentions resistance in Gilan, especially Rasht, 
and Mazandaran. He also discussed instances of popular sentiment advocating the 
separation Azerbaijan from the rest of Iran and the signing of some telegrams from 
Tabriz to the shah with “Mellat-i Azerbaijan” (the nation of Azerbaijan).21 He also 
acknowledged tensions between Azeris and Persians before and during the 
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Constitutional Revolution, but only discusses these divisions as one of many that the 
Shah manipulated during the Civil War. These ambiguities revolved around the 
questions of Iranian Azerbaijan’s connection to nascent nationalist and separatist 
aspirations in Russian Azerbaijan and the Caucasus generally. Afary and Bayat 
expanded upon the extent to which Iranian political organizations and culture were 
connected to the Caucasus. 
 Afary and Bayat saw the defining characteristics of Azerbaijan and the Caucasus 
as their secularism and leftist politics. While they, like Browne, Keddie, and 
Abrahamian, emphasized Tabriz and the Caucuses as revolutionary centers, they 
defined society there in a radically different way. Both Afary and Bayat saw Azerbaijan 
as radical due to the ethnic and trade linkages between Azerbaijan and the Caucasus. 
Unlike Abrahamian, they contextualized Azeri political activity in Russia by 
emphasizing discrimination against Azeris, and their resultant labor organizing and 
nascent ethnic nationalist aspirations. They combined Keddie and Taqizadeh’s emphasis 
on the satirical and anti-clerical print culture of the Caucasus with Abrahamain’s 
emphasis on leftist political organizations to create a distinct vision of the political 
culture of Azerbaijan. The consequence of this was that “the rebellions were more 
prominent in the northern and more prosperous areas of Gilan and Azerbaijan, which as 
a result of extensive trade and ethnic ties were directly influenced by the flow of radical 
ideas from Transcaucasia.”22 However, Afary and Bayat emphasized different aspects 
of Azerbaijan’s radicalism. Bayat emphasized the anti-clerical and secularist aspects of 
political culture in the Caucasus and in Iranian Azerbaijan. Afary placed more emphasis 
on peasant rebellions and other “grassroots” organizing. However, Bayat and Afary 
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largely ignored the question of Azeri ethnic nationalism, which was not seen as relevant 
to Bayat’s investigation of religion or Afary socio-economic analysis.  
 Touraj Atabaki had a unique perspective on the role of Azeris in the 
Constitutional Revolution due to the unique aim of his work. In Azerbaijan: Ethnicity 
and Autonomy is Twentieth-Century Iran, Atabaki sees the Constitutional Revolution, 
specifically the role of Tabriz during the Lesser Despotism (1908-1909), as the “genesis 
of the autonomous movement” of Azerbaijan.23 Instead of juxtaposing the 
Constitutional Revolution with the 1979 Revolution, Atabaki compares Azeri political 
organization during the Constitutional Revolution with the 1946 Azerbaijan Crisis. 
From this perspective, “Azeri” identity was still in its “genesis.” Azeris spoke a Turkic 
language and had a very different experience during the Constitutional Revolution, but 
it was by no means accepted that Azeris constituted a distinct nation. Rather, the 
consolidation of Azeri identity occurred after the spread of pan-Turkish settlement and 
the establishment of the Azeri S.S.R. after World War One. Rather, sentiment in 
Azerbaijan was representative of the rest of Iran and favored “centralized government 
based on law and order.”24 In this way, Azeris fought alongside Iranians of varying 
ethnic and regional identities (i.e. Armenian, Gilani, and Bakhtiyari).25 Atabaki’s 
scholarship calls into question to what extent the categorization of Azeri’s as a separate 
ethnicity or nation. Rather, this view may be anachronistic. However, Atabaki, like 
Bayat and Afary, emphasized Azerbaijan as a stronghold of constitutional sentiment and 
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does not discuss royalist elements in Azerbaijan, even though they controlled part of 
Tabriz during the siege.  
 Martin’s Iran Between Islamic Nationalism and Secularism emphasized 
reactionary and anti-Constitutional elements in Azerbaijan. She still characterized 
Tabriz and Azerbaijan as the most “radical” centers of anti-clericalism and leftist 
politics. However, Martin contended that discussions of secularism were confined to 
elite circles in Tehran and Tabriz, and were not reflective of mass sentiments.26 Further, 
she pointed out that popular conceptions of what was secular or religious frequently 
changed.27 The Anjoman-i Islamiya’s political activity against the Social Democrats 
and for the Crown was foregrounded, as were other “reactionary” activities in 
Azerbaijan. Although Tabriz was the home of the most radical activists, Martin saw this 
as but one brand of Constitutionalist sentiment that was not even universally accepted in 
Azerbaijan. She emphasized the linkages of reactionary anjomans to Tehran, while 
other authors emphasized connections between radical in Iran and the Caucasus. In this 
way, Martin attempted to give a more nuanced view of Azerbaijan that drew 
comparisons between it and other regions of Iran, instead of assuming its uniqueness. In 
some ways, this was a melding of the Keddie and Browne views of Iranian society. 
Martin acknowledged Azerbaijan’s secularism, but was clear to point out its 
uniqueness.  
 There is an ambiguity in the literature about the role of Azeris in Iranian society. 
This is a question of social history, but also a question of understanding social change. 
Central to this ambiguity are unresolved questions about the nature of Azeri identity 
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during this period. An analysis remains difficult as the definition or even existence of a 
distinct “Azeri” identity was forming at the same time. Scholars run the risk of 
projecting identities that we are currently comfortable with onto a period in history 
when those identities and concepts did not exist or were not yet fully formed. Research 
on this aspect of the Constitutional Revolution would likely benefit from archival 
research in Baku and Moscow that explores the political and social environment in 
Baku, especially as related to migrant Iranian workers. There are linguistic and 
professional hurdles to this. Such research would require strong Russian, Azeri Turkish, 
and Persian language knowledge. Further, expanding the horizon of research into the 
Constitutional Revolution would not provide a framework for understanding identity 
during this period. However, by turning to the scholarship on Armenian participation in 
the Constitutional Revolution, scholars may find a solution. 
 
The Armenians: “Walking Arsenals” 
 The history of the Armenian contribution to the Constitutional Revolution has 
gradually broadened from a history of elites to a social-cultural history of Armenian 
participation in the Constitutional Revolution. The literature was more comfortable 
using the term “Armenian” to refer to a distinct group with its own history than it was in 
the Azeri case. However, there was a reluctance to name individuals, particularly great 
individuals, as Armenian. As historians began to detail the events of the siege of 
Azerbaijan and the Civil War of 1908-1909, they emphasized the military contributions 
of Armenian revolutionaries. Eventually, these revolutionaries were associated not only 
with the Caucasus, but also with the Armenian Hchnak and Dashnak revolutionary 
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parties. Research into the Armenian contribution to the Constitutional Revolution has 
provided important insight into the political and social environment of northern Iran and 
the Caucasus. However, the emphasis on an “Armenian” history of the Constitutional 
Revolution has often come at the cost of Persian language sources and connections to 
events in Iran. The remedies to these problems are difficult due to issues of archival 
access and linguistic training.   
 Brown championed the contributions of individuals Armenians, but was careful 
to downplay the role of Armenian “revolutionaries.” In particular, Brown championed 
Malkom Khan and Yephraim Khan. Both were examples of brave and enlightened 
Iranians who were “awakened” members of an Iranian nation. However, their status as 
Armenians was ambiguous. This ambiguity was a result of Browne’s “Whig” 
framework for understanding history and his political objectives. Browne was very 
careful to emphasize the national character of the Constitutional Revolution and to 
deemphasize ethnic or Russian participation. Browne chastised the Times for 
exaggerating the role of “Caucasian and Armenian revolutionaries.”28 Further, Browne 
mentioned in a lengthy endnote addressed a disagreement between the Iran-e No and 
the Times. In its February 10, 1910 edition, the Times stated that the paper Iran-e No 
was “controlled by Armenians and Russians from the Caucasus.”29 He included the 
response of Iran-e No that, while affirming Armenian membership in the Iranian nation, 
denied that it had any Armenian members on its staff. Browne was at pains to show that 
the Constitutionalists were both representative of the “national will”, while 
downplaying British fears of increasing Russian influence or possible radicalization. 
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This fear of foreign intervention in the Revolution was the basis for Browne’s suspicion 
of the “Armenian cause.” 
 Browne was also suspicious about how the “Armenian cause” might be used to 
justify support for the Royalist cause. Brown did mention moments of tension between 
the “Moslem” world and Armenians. Quoting Habl-al Matn, Brown saw “Armenian 
agitation and other internal troubles” in the Ottoman Empire as proof of “England’s 
favorite policy” of inciting political unrest to keep its competitors off balance.30 The 
issue of Azeri and Armenian enmity was important not only because it might elicit 
sympathy from British and Russian publics, but was also identified as a key aspect of 
the political and social atmosphere of the Caucasus.  
 Armenian participation in the Constitutional Revolution was difficult for Keddie 
to integrate into her work about Islam and the Constitutional Revolution. Keddie’s 
translation of Taqizadeh says very little about Armenian participation, but does mention 
Armenian-Azeri violence. As discussed above, Taqizadeh highlighted violence between 
“Armenians and Moslems” as a cause of increased political agitation by “Caucasian 
Moslems.”31 The participation of Armenians in the Constitutional Revolution posed an 
important and difficult question for Keddie. Her thesis about the crucial role played by 
Twelver Shia ‘ulama in mobilizing support for the Constitution does not explain 
Armenian participation. The Armenians did not fit. Abrahamian’s more class minded 
history was better able to integrate Armenians.   
 Abrahamian wrote about Armenian contributions to the Constitutional 
Revolution primarily in the context of the civil war and the siege of Tabriz. Like 
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previous authors, he mentioned Yeprem Khan and Malkom Khan.32However, they were 
identified more with modernization and reform efforts inside of Iran than they were 
with Armenia. Much as was the case with Abrahamian’s treatment of Azeri activism, 
Armenian activism was primarily associated with leftist political organizations, 
specifically the Dashnak party and the Social Democrat Party. Abrahamian does not 
give a detailed account of their participation. He only mentioned the Dashnak party in 
terms of their alliance with the “radical” Democrat Party and their contribution to the 
siege of Tabriz in the form of much need military expertise and arms. Much like the 
Azeri case, Abrahamian’s treatment of the Dashnaks and Armenians raised questions 
about the extent of Armenian and cooperation and how activists reconciled competing 
identities and political objectives. These questions would be taken up to a certain extent 
by Afary.   
 Afary emphasized the role of the Dashnak and Hnchak parties in promoting 
social democracy during the Constitutional Revolution. For Afary, “[t]he most 
important international support the resistance movement in Azerbaijan and Gilan 
received was from members of the RSDWP as well as Dashnak and Hnchak 
Armenians.”33 Further, Azeri-Armenian tensions did not spill over into the 
Constitutional Revolution and “an outstanding aspect of the resistance movement in 
Azerbaijan and Gilan was its international and non-denominational character.”34 It was 
the “revolutionary movement” that “lessened animosity among various ethnic groups” 
and placed these ethnicities under the same banner.35 While the multi-ethnic solidarity 
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of Azerbaijan was firmly established in Afary’s account, she did not systematically 
explain why Iran saw multi-ethnic cooperation, while the Caucasus saw conflict. 
Further, Afary did not describe the relationship between the Dashnak and Hnchak 
parties. Finally, Afary did not deal with how Armenian political activists, like the 
Dashnaks and Hnchaks, who advocated separatism and autonomy for the Armenian 
community, reconciled their political aspirations with the centralization and Iranian 
nationalism often associated with the Constitutional Revolution. These questions would 
be taken up by the only work to date that exclusively focused on the role of Armenians 
in the Constitutional Revolution.  
 Houri Berberian’s Armenians and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911 
attempted to answer these questions and, in the process, offered a framework for 
understanding minority political participation in the Constitutional Revolution. 
Berberian focused on three factors to explain the unique experience of an ethnic group 
that was both at the center and periphery of the Constitutional Revolution: the 
revolutionary and intellectual environment of the Caucasus, the desire of the political 
left to counter communal violence between Caucasian Armenians and Muslims by 
encouraging collaboration between the two groups in the constitutional movement, and 
the fluidity of identities that made participation possible.36 Her solution was both 
elegant and meticulously backed by archival evidence in the Dashnak archives.  
 Berberian’s work raised important historiographical questions about the 
Constitutional Revolution. While Berberian’s analysis of Armenian sources is 
meticulous, it suffered from not engaging with Persian sources. As Mangol Bayat 
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pointed out in her review of the book, “this exposé of the complex Armenian-Iranian 
relationship during the revolution suffers from the lack of a broader historical 
perspective. The reader is left without a proper understanding of the nature, scope, and 
context of the revolution.”37 She specifically faults Berberian for not corroborating 
Armenian sources with “their Persian counterparts.” She also commented that the book 
would have benefited from more details about the relationship between Armenian 
political parties and their Russian counter parts. However, the possible solution to these 
flaws would require archival research that may not be possible. 
 Archival access and research languages are an impediment to further research on 
the Caucasian contribution to the Constitutional Revolution. Abrahamian in his review 
of Armenians and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911 pointed out that archival 
access to Armenian materials in Turkey and Iran remains inconsistent and difficult.38 
Berberian’s analysis could only be taken further with access to Hnchack archives, or to 
Ottoman and Iran archival documents relating to the period. Even if access were 
guaranteed, the number of research languages to do a history of the Constitutional 
Revolution would require Persian, Armenian, Russian, Georgian, and Turkish. Iago 
Gocheleishvili in his article “Introducing Georgian Sources for the Historiography of 
the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911)” pointed out that there remain 
extensive archives in Georgian that speak to Armenian and Georgian participation in the 
Constitutional Revolution.39 Even though these sources likely include important 
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insights, only a researcher with the necessary language skills and institutional support 
would be able to use them. 
 
The Bakhtiyari Tribe: The Protectors of the People  
 The Bakhtiyari tribe’s contribution to the Constitutional Revolution is another 
example of a historiographical difficult perspective that is both central and peripheral to 
the story of the Constitutional Revolution. When the Bakhtiyari were included in 
narratives of the Constitutional Revolution, it was usually from the perspective of their 
military contribution to the retaking of Tehran in 1909. Further, Bakhtiyari motivations 
were usually ascribed to plunder or settling tribal grievances. However, recent research 
has examined the social-cultural effects of the economic integration of the Bakhtiyari.  
Research on the Bakhtiyari role, much less the role of other tribes, has been remarkably 
limited.  As is the case with other pastoral groups, the Bakhtiyaris left few archival 
records of their history. Further, even fewer of these records are of their own making. 
Thus, Bakhtiyari historiography is different from the Azeri and Armenian cases, in that 
the obstacles to further research are a lack of documents rather than issues of 
accessibility. 
 The Bakhtiyari primarily entered Browne’s narrative as symbols of a brave 
Iranian nation. Browne again chastised the Times for depicting the Bakhtiyaris as 
“completely indifferent to the Constitution, and as actuated solely by tribal ambitions, 
innate love of fighting, and hatred of a dynasty at whose hands they had suffered 
	  
 80	  
much.”40 Much like the Armenians, the Bakhtiyaris were discussed almost entirely from 
a military perspective.  
 Keddie and Abrahamian remained largely silent on the role of the Bakhtiyari. 
Both authors emphasized the participation of urban populations in the Constitutional 
Revolution. Keddie also acknowledged that because tribes were primarily Sunni and 
received religious guidance from their sheikhs, they fell outside of reach of the ʿulama 
and presented a problem for her particular take on Iranian history. Abrahamian, like 
Browne, emphasized the leadership of Sardar Asʿad and the military contribution of the 
Bakhtiyari tribe to the re-conquest of Isfahan and Tehran by the Constitutional forces.41 
 Garthwaite’s Khans and Shahs highlighted the role of the Bakhtiyari elite 
politics in determining the tribes’ participation in the Constitutional Revolution. 
Garthwaite meticulously wove together anthropological accounts and primary source 
documents and depicted a tribe with a divided leadership structure that was only 
capable of coordinating under unique conditions. For Garthwaite, the Bakhtiyari were 
primarily motivated by the lure of spoils. Garthwaite traces the start of Bakhtiyari 
activism to the Civil War, when constitutionalists in Isfahan, in response to the 
appointment of “the oppressive Iqbal al-Daulah as governor of Isfahan,” requested 
Bakhtiyari assistance and “promised to support the Bakhtiyari and to pay Bakhtiyari 
expenses in Isfahan.”42 The Bakhtiyari were drawn deeper into the conflict by the 
promise of wealth and power. While Garthwaite cited Sardar Asʿad’s trip from Europe 
and the Lynch and Oil Syndicate as possible contributors to Bakhtiyari unity and 
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enthusiasm for the Constitutional cause, the various sects of the Bakhtiyari tribe truly 
united “in anticipation of the wealth and power that might be gained if they were to help 
establish a constitutional government.”43 Garthwaite sees the Secret Agreement of 1909, 
which divided any future wealth and power equally between the two main factions of 
the Bakhtiyari, as key to ensuring sustained Bakhtiyari participation. It also revealed 
“the true motivation behind Bakhtiyari unity and their pragmatic approach to the 
revolution.”44 Garthwaite emphasized internal divisions inside the Bakhtiyari tribe, 
between the Bakhtiyaris and the rest of the Constitutional Coalition, and between the 
Bakhtiyaris and other tribes. The weakness of the Bakhtiyaris lay “within themselves 
and their own political instability.”45  
 Afary also emphasized material gains as the primary motivation for Bakhtiyari 
participation in the Constitutional Revolution. Afary emphasized Bakhtiyari enmity 
against the Qajar tribe.46 Further, Afary emphasized Sardar Asʿad’s leadership and 
personal sympathy for to the Constitutional Movement in securing Bakhtiyari support. 
After the re-conquest of Tehran by Constitutionalist, Afary quotes Schuster in 
criticizing the Bakhtiyari’s for their “mercenary attitude” and “noncommittal attitude.”47 
By the time of the Second Majles, the Bakhtiyaris increasingly found themselves at 
odds with the centralizing efforts of the Constitutional government and other tribes, 
jealous of the Bakhtiyari position in Tehran.48 Thus, Afary seemed to view tribal 
participation in a movement that sought ultimately to curtail tribal freedoms as a 
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contradiction that could only be explained by the desire for the spoils of war and, in the 
case of Sardar Asʿad, sympathy for the constitutional cause. In this way, the only 
possible motivation for Bakhtiyari participation would be financial gain and the settling 
of old rivalries with other tribes.    
 In Tribes and Empires: On the Margins of Nineteenth-Century Iran, Arash 
Khazeni explained the support of the Bakhtiyari tribe for the Constitutional Revolution 
by looking at social-cultural changes inside the Bakhtiyari tribe and in Iran before and 
during the Constitutional Revolution. Rather than seeing the Constitutional Government 
as the start of efforts to curtail the power of the tribes, Khazeni saw the 19th century as 
marked by efforts to open Bakhtiyari lands and subjugate the tribes. Khazeni wrote that, 
“the Constitutional Revolution occurred as the tribes in Iran were becoming 
increasingly subject to state expansion and centralization.”49 Bakhtiyari support for the 
Constitutional cause caused a “significant shift” in representations of the tribes of Iran, 
especially the Bakhtiyari. The tribes of Iran “no longer appeared as subjects of empire 
but as people of the homeland.”50 Similarly, Khazeni pointed out that the participation 
of the Bakhtiyari in the Constitutional Revolution, made possible by the opening of 
Bakhtiyari lands through British and Qajar imperial projects, brought on serious social 
changes inside the Bakhtiyari. The moment represented a “duality between autonomy 
and assimilation.” Bakhtiyari khans and ordinary members of the tribe “embraced the 
homeland- vatan – even though they did not entirely relinquish their traditional tribal 
motives or leave their tribal conscience behind.”51 In this way, the Bakhtiyari were very 
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much like their Azeri and Armenian counterparts, balancing multiple identities at the 
same time. 
 Further research into tribal contributions to the Constitutional Revolution would 
be complicated by a lack of documents. Due to Sardar Asʿad’s efforts, a Bakhtiyari 
account of the Constitutional Revolution was recorded. Further, there are extensive 
records about the Bakhtiyari in the British National Archives and the British Petroleum 
Archives. Other tribes, like the Shahsavan or Qashqai, did not have the same level of 
commercial and diplomatic contact with imperial powers. Even if few new documents 
remain, there are still new ways to look at Bakhtiyari history. 
 
Conclusion:  
 Despite the vastly different backgrounds of Azeris, Armenians, and Bakhtiaris, 
their historiography reveals certain commonalities. The participation of these groups in 
the Constitutional Revolution was seen as both central, but the unique perspective of 
these groups remained incompletely acknowledged. Further, recent literature 
emphasized the fluid and ambiguous nature of minority identities during this period. 
The perspective of these groups will remain difficult to integrate into the larger body of 
Iranian history due to the number of research languages needed and ongoing problems 
with archival access. 
 An example of how this could be achieved is Shattered Dreams of Revolution by 
Bedross Der Matossian. Instead of looking at minority contributions to the Turkish 
Constitutional Revolution of 1908 piece-meal or in isolation, Matossian looks at how 
the emerging Jewish, Armenian, and Arab public spheres interacted with one another 
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and with the dominant Turkish public sphere.  Much like the Iranian case, he examined 
how the Revolution and enactment of a constitution raised expectations and how these 
feelings were internalized and negotiated by different groups.52 The differing 
expectations and perspective of dominant and non-dominant groups led to the rise of 
ethnic tension and disappointment in the new democratic order.   
 Matossian faced similar historiographic problems to those faced by scholars of 
Iran. The account of minority perspectives is not comprehensive. For linguistic reasons, 
Matossian was unable to include the perspectives of Greeks, Albanians, Kurds, 
Bulgarians, Assyrians, and Macedonians.53 Further, the archival records of Assyrians 
and Kurds are now held by several countries. Instead of looking for new sources to 
create ever longer and more detailed monographs, new research could engage in “a 
comparative, inter- and intra-communal, cross-cultural analysis and initiate further 
dialogue among scholars in studies in a variety of disciplines.”54  
 This approach can help answer fundamental historical questions. How did elite 
ideas about the nation come to be embraced by the non-elite masses? How did subjects 
become citizens? In the case of Iran and the Ottoman Empire, this process occurred in 
the midst of multiple nationalisms that were in competition and in conversation with 
one another. Exposure to these new identities was distributed unevenly. Not all 
Armenians participated in the siege of Tabriz. Only a portion of Armenian society was 
actively involved in Revolutionary activity. Similarly, not all Iranian Azeris traveled to 
Baku or even had contact with someone who travelled to Baku. By stepping back and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






examining the inter- and intra-communal differences in how the promise and legacy of 




1941 as the Encore of 1906 
 
 Our understanding of the Constitutional Revolution has been dependent on how 
scholars imagined or constructed a system of thought or behavior for political and social 
action. By examining how the Iranian nation is parsed or divided up to fit into global 
narratives of change, we saw that the social history of Iran is an important aspect of our 
understanding of Iran, even when trying to assume a macro-view of social change. 
Social change is explained in a global context by focusing on social phenomenon that 
are common to all nations, but only one part of the Constitutional Revolution. In the 
case of the ʿulama, we examined how various authors used the ʿulama to explain social 
change through religion and culture. In the case of ethnic minorities, we examined how 
the experience of marginalized groups, though crucial to understanding Iranian society 
and the Constitutional Revolution, have not been integrated into our understanding of 
social change in Iran. What were common to all three accounts were controversies over 
the social history of Iran, born out of research difficulties both specific to Iran and in 
general to social history. In some cases, reference to present history has filled in gaps. 
In others, reference to sociological theories of study has allowed historians to maximize 
the available sources  
 We still do not understand the root cause of social change in Iran, in part 
because there are basic disagreements about the composition and values of Iranian 
society. Global narratives have struggled to balance an understanding of the 
peculiarities of Iranian society into generalized or global explanations of social change. 
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This was largely possible by focusing on those classes or groups, which could be 
compared or were similar to groups in Europe or in other countries. However, these 
groups, though influential, may not have been in fact the agents of change inside of 
Iran. In the case of ethnic minorities, we see the need not just for social history but also 
for historical sociology. These groups have, to a certain extent, been accorded, in the 
word of E.P. Thompson, the “condescension of posterity.” While they certainly have 
agency inside of their own narratives, they are largely set off from the rest of Iranian 
history.  
 Existing efforts to explore Qajar society, while helpful, are not sufficient. 
Iranian Studies devoted four issues in 2001 to Qajar society, especially Qajar art and 
print culture.1 While these articles provided important insight into the beliefs and views 
of elite Iranians, these works have limited applications in explaining the Constitutional 
Revolution. As discussed before, studies of the Constitutional Revolution require a 
marriage of both social history and historical sociology. This work into Qajar society 
helps illuminate elite society, but it does little to help scholars understand the actions of 
“the masses.” Rather, this research is an instance of the unfortunate tendency in history 
to “uncover what has hitherto been unknown, and to enjoy what we find.” Rather, “what 
we really want to know is why such beliefs were held, how they fitted in with the rest of 
the value-system of those communities…and why they changed or didn’t change.”2 
Scholars need to combine imagination and information to try and reconstruct “a 
coherent, preferably a consistent, system of behavior or thought- and one which can be, 
in some senses, inferred once we know the basic social assumptions, parameters and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Iranian Studies 34, no. 1-4 (Spring-Winter, 2001) 
2 Hobsbawm, On History, 214-215. 
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tasks of the situation, but before we know very much about that situation.”3 It is this 
system, grounded in a conception of Iranian society, which scholars have tried to create. 
 Historians of Iran have chased that “system of behavior or thought” for the fifty 
years. Browne had the convenient crutch of Whig history to resolve the issue. Keddie, 
Algar, and Lambton used Shiʿi Islam to provide this basic system of belief and thought. 
Afary, Bayat, and Abrahamian largely relied on socio-economic conceptions of social 
change, and used class conflict and material interest to explain action. However, this fell 
short of the goals of social historians like E.P. Thompson who tried to replace a 
“prototypical working class” with a concrete working class, “which emerged within a 
specific historical context.”4 After the cultural turn of the 1980’s and 1990’s, the project 
of social history was no longer in vogue.  
 The history of the Constitutional Revolution has become allegory. Even under 
the best of circumstances, the grassroots historian “finds only what he is looking for, not 
what is already waiting for him.”5 This is doubly true in the case of the Constitutional 
Revolution, which unlike the French or Russian Revolutions, was not documented by an 
effective bureaucracy or a domestic print culture. As a result of this inevitable research 
problem, historians apply different theoretical understanding of human nature, 
emphasizing particular sources as “essential” or “representative, and use contemporary 
understandings as a starting point for discussions of Iranian society in order to construct 
the mentality of Iranian society.   
 We can improve our understanding of Iranian society by looking at Iran after the 
Constitutional Revolution. Two of the most significant accomplishments of the Reza 
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Shah period were the establishment of a modern, national bureaucracy and a national 
education system. Consequently, records of Iranian society, both from above and from 
bellow, increased. The Iranian government developed the capacity to govern and 
document its population. The expansion of education had a profound effect on literary 
culture in Iran. The expansion of literacy provided an audience, while government 
promotion of printing for textbooks expanded the internal publishing capacity of Iran. 
When the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941 deposed Reza Shah, Iran was equipped 
to debate and document the Constitutional Revolution. There exists a host of 
government documents, parliamentary debates, memoirs, and histories that addressed 
Iranian society in the immediate aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution.  
 Many of the key Persian language accounts, now relied on as primary sources of 
the Constitutional Revolution (i.e. Kasravi and Malekzadeh) were written or edited 
during this period. After the fall of Reza Shah in 1941, the Majles was restored to power 
and quickly restored individual freedoms. Newspapers and political parties sprang up 
overnight. These formerly suppressed voices felt an immediate need to address the 
Constitutional Revolution, which they had been unable to do during the chaos of World 
War I and the subsequent repression of Reza Shah.   
 In many ways, the “revolution” of 1941 is a better point of comparison to 1906 
than the Revolution of 1979. While Iranian society had changed significantly since 
1906, there were still points of correspondence between the Iran of 1941 and the Iran of 
1906. The Constitution of 1906 was still in place. Reza Shah had, for a variety of 
reasons, never repealed the Constitution, even if he subverted its intent. Food security, 
especially price inflation and hoarding by merchants, was a major issue in Iranian 
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society during the early 1940’s. The tribes remained a major political and military force 
capable of challenging authority. Iran’s ethnic and religious minorities remained 
incompletely integrated into Iranian society. In a particular point of symmetry, an 
autonomous government backed by “Caucasian revolutionaries” formed in Azerbaijan 
in both 1908 and 1946. Studying Iran during the 1940’s offers a way to “touch” the 
Constitutional Revolution. Iran was characterized by similar social phenomenon and a 
had a similar social composition. This second constitutional period also resulted in the 
return of autocracy and consolidation of popular support around a “strongman” capable 
of holding Iran together. If the Tobacco Protests of 1890 were a dress rehearsal for the 
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